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THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE: SUBVERTING
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NAME OF SOVEREIGNTY
Natsu Taylor Saito+
To deny any person their human rights is to challenge their very
humanity.
Nelson Mandela1
I. INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
Human rights law is a subset of the system of international law that
evolved in Europe over the several centuries during which European
states were consolidated and reached out to lay claim to the rest of the
world. Because it is a system created by states, one of its bedrock
principles is recognition of and respect for the sovereignty of states.2
Nonetheless, one of the fundamental tenets of human rights law, as it has
developed since World War II, is that it limits state sovereignty. As all of
the major world powers have acknowledged, universal principles of
human rights must be accepted as binding on all states because domestic
laws designed to protect the rights of "insiders" often fail to protect those
+ Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. A version of this article was
first presented at the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Conference at Georgetown University
Law Center in January 2002. I am grateful to the organizers of that conference, to
Michele Goodman for coordinating this symposium issue, to the editors of the Catholic
University Law Review, and particularly to Ward Churchill.
1. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 205 (1996) (quoting a statement by
Nelson Mandela to a joint session of the United States Congress).
2. See Father Robert Araujo, Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Self-Determination:
The Meaning of International Law, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1477, 1480-83, 1486-88 (2001)
(arguing for recognition of the sovereignty of nations as well as states). Despite the
common conflation of the terms, I distinguish states from nations. "Nation" as used
herein refers to "the geographically bounded territory of a common people as well as to
the people themselves. A nation is a cultural territory made up of communities of
individuals who see themselves as 'one people' on the basis of common ancestry, history,
society, institutions, ideology, language, territory, and, often, religion." Bernard
Neitschmann, The Fourth World. Nations Versus States, in REORDERING THE WORLD:
GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 226 (George J. Demko
& William B. Wood eds., 1994). Nietschmann defines a state as "a centralized political
system within international legal boundaries recognized by other states. Further, it uses a
civilian-military bureaucracy to establish one government and to enforce one set of
institutions and laws. . . .This system is imposed on many preexisting nations and
peoples." Id. at 227.
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regarded as "others" within the state or within territories controlled by
the state.3
Human rights law is thus intended to protect the fundamental rights of
individuals against violations by the governments that rule them; to
protect racial, ethnic, national, and religious minorities within states; and
to ensure the rights of peoples to self-determination. The latter is
particularly critical because of the colonial legacy of arbitrary imposition
of state boundaries upon indigenous nations in almost every part of the
world . Louis Henkin says:
Human rights is the idea of our time. It asserts that every
human being, in every society, is entitled to have basic
autonomy and freedoms respected and basic needs satisfied....
The society has corresponding duties to give effect to these
rights through domestic laws and institutions.
Today, the human rights idea is universal, accepted by virtually
all states and societies regardless of historical, cultural,
ideological, economic, or other differences. It is international,
the subject of international diplomacy, law, and institutions.'
The United States was one of the earliest proponents of the basic
principle that state sovereignty cannot override basic human rights or
humanitarian law.6 Following World War II, the United States was the
leading advocate among the Allied Powers of incorporating this principle
into the London Charter, justifying the criminal trials held at Nuremberg
and Tokyo on the grounds that German and Japanese leaders were
personally responsible for violations of established international law
even when their conduct was in compliance with, or mandated by,
domestic law.' The United States was also instrumental in ensuring that
3. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law.- Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1982) ("[I]t is well known that
the legal enforcement system is less effective against those who are powerful than...
those who are poor and weak."); TZVETAN TODOROV, THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA:
THE QUESTION OF THE OTHER 3-5 (1984); HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF
CULTURE 66-84 (1994).
4. See Nietschmann, supra note 2, at 225-42. See generally HUGH SETON-WATSON,
NATIONS AND STATES: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF NATIONS AND THE POLITICS
OF NATIONALISM (1977).
5. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS I (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
6. See RICHARD FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 11-12, 195
(1981); GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GLOBAL JUSTICE 14-15, 24 (1999).
7. See BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE ROAD TO NUREMBERG 4 (1981) ("After we allow
for the spirit of the age as well as for the legal background, . . . the central fact is that the
Nuremberg trial system was created almost exclusively in Washington by a group of
1116 [Vol. 51:101
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this approach was subsequently ratified by the United Nations as binding
international law.8
The United States is frequently criticized for its reluctance to ratify
human rights agreements or to accept the jurisdiction of international
decision-making bodies.9 However-with the exception of a few voices,
such as that of Senator Jesse Helms-the U.S. government does not
generally justify its actions with the argument that sovereignty permits
the violation of basic human rights.' ° Instead, it typically responds that it
does not need to bind itself to international human rights instruments
because the U.S. legal system provides not only full justice but more
protection than international law."
The United States' failure to comply with the most fundamental tenets
of international law with respect to many people and peoples under its
jurisdiction is not merely a result of its failure to ratify human rights
conventions or participate in international institutions. Even when the
United States becomes a party to multilateral treaties or acknowledges
relevant customary law, U.S. courts frequently refuse to enforce
international law, particularly when it is violated by congressional or
executive action. Instead of recognizing that domestic courts are the
most important forum for the enforcement of international law 2 or
American government officials."). See generally BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE AMERICAN
ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD, 1944-45 5-12 (1982).
8. For the text of the Nuremberg Principles, adopted by the International Law
Commission of the United Nations in 1950, see WAR CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF
NUREMBERG 339-40 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999).
9. See, e.g., Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights,
International Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775 (2001);
M. Christian Green, The "Matrioshka" Strategy: US Evasion of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 357 (1994).
10. The United States generally claims to be promoting the rule of law, as illustrated
by recent attempts to justify an invasion of Iraq on the basis of Saddam Hussein's
violations of U.N. resolutions. See Bob Kemper, Bush to UN: Act on Iraq, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 13, 2002, at 1.
11. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 65-80 (1990). See generally Louis
Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995); Elizabeth A. Reimels, Playing for Keeps: The United States
Interpretation of International Prohibitions Against the Juvenile Death Penalty - The US.
Wants to Play the International Human Rights Game, But Only If It Makes the Rules, 15
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 303 (2001).
12. ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW COURSEBOOK 261 (1994) ("Any
international lawyer will estimate that over 99 percent of the cases that turn on rules of
international law are filed in domestic courts."); see also Louis Henkin, The Constitution
and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100
HARV. L. REv. 853, 876 (1987) ("determining international law, for purposes of
adjudication in a decentralized, international system, is inherently the role of domestic
courts").
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taking seriously the Constitution's mandate that treaties are part of the
supreme law of the land, 3 federal courts have created a vast array of
judicial doctrines that render international law nearly meaningless within
U.S. jurisprudence.
These self-imposed judicial limitations include the declaration of some
treaties or treaty provisions as "non-self-executing" and the consequent
refusal to enforce them in the absence of enabling legislation;4 the "last-
in-time" rule under which later-enacted federal laws are enforced even if
they put the United States squarely in violation of its treaty obligations;"5
the "political question doctrine" under which certain issues are declared
"non-justiciable" because they address subjects delegated to Congress or
the Executive; 16 the "act of state" doctrine under which courts refrain
from judging the actions of other sovereigns, 7 and the refusal to allow
prosecution of actions against the U.S. government on grounds of
sovereign immunity. 8 The combined effect of these doctrines is that U.S.
courts are not effective fora for the redress of violations of international
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land."); see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination.").
t4. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (declaring that the treaty at
issue was in the nature of a contract to perform a particular act and therefore required
legislation to be enforceable in court). It is difficult to tell which treaties will be declared
non-self-executing. See, e.g., United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88-89 (1833)
(finding the same treaty addressed in Foster to be self-executing after reconciling the
Spanish and English versions). Sometimes, select provisions of treaties will be determined
to be self-executing or non-self-executing. See Fujii v. Calif., 242 P.2d 617, 619-21, 628
(1952) (refusing to find the non-discrimination provisions of the U.N. Charter self-
executing, but invalidating California's alien land laws on the basis of Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection).
15. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (enforcing a later-enacted law
exempting Hawaiian sugar from duty despite its conflict with an earlier treaty with the
Dominican Republic); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 115 (1987).
16. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-13 (1962) (finding judicial deference to the
"political branches" of government appropriate with respect to certain matters of foreign
policy).
17. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 400-01, 416-20 (1964);
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252-54 (1897).
t8. See United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1834) (first recognizing the
sovereign immunity of the federal government); Koehler v. United States, 155 F.3d 262,
267 (5th Cir. 1998); Brown v. United States, 141 F.3d 800, 803 (8th Cir. 1998) (both cases
holding that unless the federal government explicitly waives immunity from a particular
kind of suit, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction).
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law; thus, the United States violates a fundamental principle of
customary international law, articulated in Article 27 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, that a "party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty."'19
There is, in addition, another extremely important judicially created
rationale for the courts' failure to enforce basic human rights, one that is
almost always overlooked in assessments of U.S. compliance with
international law. This is the doctrine that both Congress and the
Executive have "plenary power" over large groups of people subject to
U.S. law.2" "Plenary" means full or complete, and the doctrine as applied
means that U.S. courts, rather than assessing governmental actions under
the usual constitutional standards, defer to the "political" branches of
government." The plenary power doctrine is explicitly justified as an
exercise of sovereignty either because those against whom it is used are
subjects of another sovereign or because the United States' national
security or foreign policy objectives are at stake. 22 Thus, the plenary
power doctrine is essential to U.S. jurisprudence relating to American
Indian nations,23 immigrants,24 and colonized territories such as Puerto
19. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 339 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). Although the United States is not a party to
the treaty, it recognizes the treaty as codifying the customary law of agreements between
states, which is binding on the United States. See Steven C. Nelson, Contemporary
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 599, 605
(1971).
20. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
21. In her thorough analysis of the plenary power, Nell Jessup Newton explains that
the term has been used to mean (1) "exclusive power," (2) "power capable of preempting
state law," and (3) "unlimited power" and illustrates that the term has been used in each
of these ways with respect to American Indians. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over
Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196 n.3 (1984); see
also DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 25-27 (1997) (describing the origins of the term in the
context of federal Indian law). See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and
the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 255, 255-86 (1984)
(noting the Supreme Court's deference to Congress in the admission and expulsion of
immigrants through use of the plenary power doctrine); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550-60 (1990) (highlighting shifts in the application of
the plenary power doctrine in immigration law cases).
2Z See, e.g., infra notes 99-100, 132, 141-42, 172-76 and accompanying text.
23. I avoid the term "tribe" both because of its association with animal groupings and
"primitive or nomadic peoples," see, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2440 (1986), and because I believe it is used to obfuscate the fact that
American Indian peoples comprise nations.
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Rico and Guam 5 Plenary authority is also exercised over persons in the
military and in prison.26
A cursory look at the common roots, functioning, and purposes of the
doctrine in U.S. immigration, Indian, and colonial law reveals significant
human rights problems. For example, the plenary power doctrine is the
legal rationale for allowing the federal government control over
indigenous peoples through its exercise of "trust" authority, by which
American Indian nations are robbed of their resources and rendered the
poorest sector of the country; 7 for detaining and arbitrarily deporting
noncitizens, most recently thousands of young men of Middle Eastern
origin not accused of any crime;"' for sanctioning the ongoing bombing of
the island of Vieques; and for continuing to refuse to allow Puerto Ricans
a binding vote on their relationship with the United States.
Nothing in the Constitution explicitly gives the federal government
such power. Explanations and justifications of the exercise of plenary
power are confused and sometimes contradictory, but they boil down to
24. To avoid using the term "aliens," I use "immigrants" in its general sense to mean
non-U.S. citizens coming to or residing in the United States, not as it is used in
immigration law to refer specifically to those noncitizens who have been granted lawful
permanent resident status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(2000). Most of the immigration
cases referencing the plenary power doctrine deal with the law governing admission and
expulsion of noncitizens. See generally LEGOMSKY, supra note 21; MOTOMURA, supra
note 21. While noncitizens are generally afforded constitutional protections in other
respects, their exercise of these rights can be chilled by the threat of deportation. See
generally David Cole, Damage Control? A Comment on Professor Neuman ' Reading of
Reno v. AADC (119 S.Ct. 936 (1999)), 14 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 347 (2000).
25. These territories currently include Puerto Rico, the Northern Marianas,
"American" Samoa, and the "U.S." Virgin Islands. Despite U.S. assertions that these
territories are "freely associated" with the United States, they are commonly recognized
as colonies. See infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text. Hawai'i is also a directly
colonized territory, but its forced incorporation into the United States has situated it
somewhat differently with respect to the plenary power doctrine. See infra notes 146-48
and accompanying text.
26. This is a significant doctrine in U.S. military law, a subject beyond the scope of
this article. See generally Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-44, 756, 758 (1974) (holding
that the First Amendment did not protect a captain's statements encouraging military
personnel to refuse combat orders); Capt. John A. Carr, USAF, Free Speech in the
Military Community: Striking a Balance Between Personal Rights and Military Necessity, 45
A.F. L. REv. 303, 307-13 (1998). One finds parallels, too, in the law governing the
treatment of U.S. prisoners. See generally Ira Bloom, Prisons, Prisoners, and Pine Forests:
Congress Breaches the Wall Separating Legislative from Judicial Power, 40 ARIz. L. REv.
389 (1998) (criticizing expanded congressional powers under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act).
27. See infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 300-20 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 256-65 and accompanying text.
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the notion that it is an extraconstitutional power inherent in sovereignty,
which the U.S. government acquired upon becoming a recognized state.3°
Thus, the theory goes, the government's powers are limited by the
Constitution with respect to domestic policy-its relations with its
political subdivisions and its citizens-but unrestrained in its dealings
with outsiders or its control over its domestic population in the context of
defending against outside threats.3' Are there no limits on the exercise of
this power?
Justifications for the doctrine invoke the need to deal effectively with
other sovereigns, so one would suppose that its exercise is limited by the
response of other sovereigns and, presumably, by the international law
that governs relations between sovereigns. But, in fact, plenary power is
used against those over whom the United States exercises essentially
complete control, in situations in which the United States neither
respects their sovereignty nor extends the usual protections of domestic
or international law. The harsh consequences of the plenary power
doctrine are generally ignored or dismissed as aberrations.32
Examination of the plenary power doctrine as a whole, however, reveals
that it is not an exception to a general rule of conformity with human
rights law but a systematic denial of both domestic and international
protections to those who most need them. As noted above, the United
States justifies its failure to incorporate international law more
specifically by arguing that domestic law provides more protection of
basic human rights.33 However, under the guise of the plenary power
doctrine, the courts not only refuse to apply the basic protections
"guaranteed" by the Constitution, but they also refuse to apply
international law, leaving the basic rights of immigrants, American
30. See infra notes 99-100, 132, 14142, 172-76 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 132, 141, 174-75 and accompanying text.
32. In attempting to justify the United States' failure to honor its treaties with Indian
Nations, Chief Justice Marshall said that "the relation of the Indians to the United States
is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else." Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). This characterization has generally been
accepted. See, e.g., FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE
HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 1-2 (1994). In his analysis of the plenary power
doctrine in immigration law, Hiroshi Motomura notes that "[i]mmigration law, as it has
developed over the past one hundred years under the domination of the plenary power
doctrine, represents an aberrational form of the typical relationship between statutory
interpretation and constitutional law." Motomura, supra note 21, at 549. While I believe
Motomura is using "aberration" in a descriptive rather than normative way, the
characterization of that which is extraconstitutional as aberrational is common and tends
to minimize the critical function played by the plenary power doctrine in American
jurisprudence.
33. See supra note 11.
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Indians, residents of U.S. "territories," and other sectors of the American
population essentially unprotected by anything except the goodwill of
Congress." The jurisprudential rationale for the plenary power doctrine
is the United States' sovereignty, and thus the United States has, in
effect, returned to the premise it explicitly rejected at Nuremberg: the
most fundamental human rights acknowledged in international law can
be overridden by domestic law.
This article presents a brief overview of the application of the plenary
power doctrine in U.S. jurisprudence 5 and considers its implications for
U.S. compliance with international law." Section II summarizes the
cases of the late 19th and early 20th centuries that first articulated the
plenary power doctrine with respect to American Indians, immigrants,
and colonial subjects. Section III considers some of the ongoing
violations of international law that result from the continued application
of the plenary power doctrine in each of these areas. Section IV
concludes that enforcement of international law, not simply extension of
constitutional protections, is necessary to prevent or redress such
violations.
II. ORIGINS OF THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES
JURISPRUDENCE
In a series of cases decided between 1886 and 1903, the United States
Supreme Court first articulated a doctrine allowing the "political"
branches of government plenary power over American Indian nations,
immigrants, and external colonies such as Puerto Rico. While generally
regarded as distinct fields of law, these cases form a consistent body of
jurisprudence in which the Court defers to the political branches of
government because the powers being exercised by Congress or the
Executive are "inherent" in the sovereignty of the United States. What
ties them together, of course, is not just this rationale but the fact that
this sovereignty is being exercised over peoples who have been
consistently identified as both social and political "outsiders" by virtue of
citizenship, national origin, race, ethnicity, or some conflation of these
34. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
35. There are many excellent critiques of the plenary power doctrine in specific fields
of U.S. law, but little in the way of overview. For a rare analysis comparing the use of the
plenary power doctrine in the fields of immigration, Indian, and territorial law, see T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002).
36. I have addressed some of these issues in Asserting Plenary Power Over the
"Other". Indians, Immigrants, Colonial Subjects and Why US. Jurisprudence Needs to
Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L. & POL. REV. 427 (2002).
1122 [Vol. 51:101
Subverting Human Rights in the Name of Sovereignty
factors. Furthermore, the plenary power doctrine is applied in each of
these areas of law to the same end: the rendering "legal" within domestic
law of governmental action that is otherwise forbidden by the
Constitution or by international law.
This Section presents a brief overview of the cases in which the plenary
power doctrine originated, cases which are still consistently cited as
precedent for the exercise of similar governmental powers against the
same or similarly situated groups. First, however, it will consider the
background against which these cases were decided-the long history of
the United States' exercise of plenary authority over another group of
"outsiders" -persons of African descent.
Africans were subjected to the plenary authority of Europeans and
their governments from their initial involuntary arrival in what was to
become America in 1619.37 The law of slavery that evolved in America
identified slaves as property, classified persons with any discernible
African ancestry as "black," presumed black persons to be slaves, and
then used the power of the federal government to protect this "property"
everywhere under its jurisdiction.38 The very existence of the Union
depended upon provisions of the Constitution that ensured that the slave
trade could not be banned before 1808,'9 that even jurisdictions where
slavery was illegal would use their police powers to return fugitive
slaves,40 and that the militia would be available to suppress slave
uprisings.4 These provisions prompted William Lloyd Garrison to call
the Constitution "a covenant with death" and "an agreement with hell.,
4
1
In 1857, the Supreme Court articulated this plenary authority clearly in
Scott v. Sanford.43 Dred Scott sued his nominal owner in federal court
arguing, among other things, that he should be adjudicated a free man
because of the time he had spent in territory where slavery was forbidden
37. See generally LERONE BENNETF, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY
OF BLACK AMERICA (1987). For background on pre-European contact by Africans, see
IVAN VAN SERTIMA, THEY CAME BEFORE COLUMBUS (1976).
38. See generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "Rather Than the
Free": Free Blacks in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17,
17-23 (1991).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
40. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 3.
41. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; see also Staughton Lynd, Slavery and the
Founding Fathers, in BLACK HISTORY: A REAPPRAISAL 115-31 (Melvin Drimmer ed.,
1968); PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE
AGE OF JEFFERSON 1-33 (2001).
42. See Paul Finkelman, A Covenant with Death: Slavery and the U.S. Constitution,
AM. VISIONS, May/June 1986, at 21.
43. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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by the Missouri Compromise." In an opinion written by Justice Taney,
the Court held that the federal court had no diversity jurisdiction because
Scott was not a citizen of Missouri. 45 Taney went on to assert that black
people were not citizens of the United States or of any particular state;
they were not even "persons" under the law.4 He described all those of
African descent as "beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to
associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so
far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect. 47  Justice Taney concluded by declaring the Missouri
Compromise unconstitutional."8 Thus, until the end of the Civil War, the
legal system supported the exercise by white persons generally, and state
governments particularly, of complete plenary authority over black
people.49
The legal framework that allowed for the exercise of such power
changed dramatically with passage of the Thirteenth,"' Fourteenth," and
Fifteenth52 Amendments to the Constitution and subsequent legal
doctrines that perpetuated racial subordination within a framework of
formal equality. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished legalized slavery
except as punishment for those convicted of crimes. 3 Subsequently,
many southern legislatures responded by passing laws that criminalized a
wide range of behavior, including idleness or vagrancy, and many
emancipated but destitute African Americans found themselves convicts
44. Id. at 43 1.
45. Id. at 426-27.
46. Id. at 407; see Simeon C. R. McIntosh, Reading Dred Scott, Plessy and Brown:
Toward a Constitutional Hermeneutics, 38 How. L.J. 53, 65-67 (1994).
47. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
48. Id. at 431. He argued that Congress could not pass a law barring citizens from
taking their property into U.S. territories. Id. at 452. It is noteworthy that this is what
Justice Brown relied on in Downes v. Bidwell as an example of how the Courts will step in
if Congress oversteps its bounds in exercising its plenary authority over territorial
possessions. See infra note 177.
49. I use the terms "white" and "black" to refer not to "races," which I consider
illegitimate social constructs, but to the classifications created by domestic law to promote
and reinforce slavery and racial hierarchy in the United States. See generally IAN F.
HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996);
MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (1994); Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du
Bois and the Illusion of Race, in "RACE," WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 21 (Henry L. Gates
ed., 1986).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (ratified 1865).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (ratified 1868).
52. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV (ratified 1870).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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leased to their former "masters," who now lacked even a financial
motivation to keep them alive." The legal system was used to enforce
the subordination of African Americans in so many ways that Justice
Miller declared in the Slaughter-House Cases" that the "black codes"
passed by southern states after abolition "imposed upon the colored race
onerous disabilities and burdens and curtailed their rights in the pursuit
of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of
little value."
The Fourteenth Amendment, responding directly to the Dred Scott
decision, declared that all persons of African descent born in the United
States were citizens of both the United States and the state in which they
lived and required state governments to extend to them the equal
protection of the law.57 Euroamerican law and policy makers-even
most abolitionists -had not expected that persons of African descent
would become full citizens, and they proceeded to reformulate legal
strategies for ensuring the continued social, political, and economic
subordination of African Americans." As a result, a two-track process
evolved in which a formal commitment to legal equality ran parallel to
legally-sanctioned race-based subordination, beginning with a series of
cases in which the Supreme Court refused to apply the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to non-governmental
conduct and "left [the African American] segment of American society
virtually unprotected against state actions .... ""
The Fifteenth Amendment, forbidding states to interfere with the right
to vote, was similarly undermined. In many disfranchisement cases, the
Supreme Court refused to reach the merits; in others, it interpreted the
amendment narrowly, upholding facially neutral legislation adopted for
discriminatory purposes, extensive discretion for voter registrars, and
54. See generally MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT
LEASING IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 1866-1928 (1996); DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE
THAN SLAVERY": PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996).
55. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
56. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 75.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
58. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Fourth Lincoln-Douglas Debate (1858), in
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN PREJUDICE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS ON RACE
FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO DAVID DUKE 286-90 (S.T. Joshi ed., 1999). See generally
WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE
NEGRO 1550-1812 (1968).
59. BLUE CLARK, LONE WOLF V. HITCHCOCK, TREATY RIGHTS AND INDIAN LAW
AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 11 (1994). See generally Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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race-based interventions by private individuals.6' In one case, the Court
"candidly conceded that even if southern disfranchisement devices were
unconstitutional, [it] was powerless to provide adequate remedies.",
6
1
As a result, by 1896 most of the gains African Americans had made
during Reconstruction had been rolled back, and Jim Crow legislation
was becoming commonplace. 62 The same Supreme Court that articulated
the plenary power doctrine in other contexts cemented this reversion in
Plessy v. Ferguson6 where Justice Brown opined that consigning Homer
Plessy, admittedly "seven-eighths caucasian," to a "colored" railroad car
was neither a "badge of servitude" violating the Thirteenth Amendment
nor a violation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. 6 Plessy was
not about the segregation of public accommodations so much as the
"broader question of constitutive rhetoric and collective identity: who
belongs to the American polity and on what conditions?" 65 Even Justice
Harlan's dissent, well-known for its assertion that the Constitution is
"color-blind," argued that compliance with the Constitution was the best
way to maintain white supremacy:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education,
in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be
for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast
to the principles of constitutional liberty."'
Plessy opened the door to a rash of segregationist legislation that
eventually extended "to every type of transportation, education, and
amusement; to public housing, restaurants, hotels, libraries, public parks
60. Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 Sup. CT. REV. 303,352-70 (1999).
61. Id. at 304; Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903); see also CHARLES A.
LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 203 (1987).
62. On the gains, see W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 670-
708 (1983). On the rollbacks, see DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW 40-43 (1992). See generally LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO
LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY (1979).
63. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
64. Id. at 542-43, 550-51.
65. McIntosh, supra note 46, at 67.
66. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559; see HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 116. In the same
dissent, Harlan dismissed the Chinese entirely as an "unassimilable" race. See generally
Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV.
151, 156 (1996) (putting the Plessy dissent into the context of Justice Harlan's decisions in
the Chinese exclusion and citizenship cases). According to Charles Lofgren, "[t]he
Justices had not gone so far as to hold explicitly that the Constitution recognized two
categories of citizenship, one for whites and the other for non-whites, analogous to the
stance it soon would take toward the inhabitants of the new territories acquired in the
imperialist binge at the end of the decade." LOFGREN, supra note 61, at 201.
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and recreational facilities, fraternal associations, marriage, employment,
and public welfare institutions." 67  In the words of Judge A. Leon
Higginbotham:
In the post-Reconstruction era, legislatures and courts
disingenuously affixed labels to their enactments and
pronouncements that suggested compliance with the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirements: labels such as "equal protection,"
"due process," and "privileges and immunities." Nevertheless,
their conduct, rulings, and declarations were most often
associated with black inferiority and powerlessness. 68
Thus, the real significance of Jim Crow laws, enacted in the midst of
efforts to disenfranchise black voters and in an era when an average of
two African Americans were "lynched by mobs - burned, hanged,
mutilated" every week, 69 lies not so much in their furtherance of
segregation per se. Rather, their significance lies in their perpetuation of
the plenary authority exercised over African Americans into an era of
formal legal equality.7°
For African Americans, the sudden shift from legal non-personhood to
full formal equality led to a long series of twists and turns that allowed
for the perpetuation of white supremacy within a legal system purporting
to extend full constitutional protection to all citizens of color. The
plenary authority exercised over African Americans has been
perpetuated in numerous ways7' but not through legal doctrine that
67. LOFGREN, supra note 61, at 202 (citing a 1950 study).
68. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 83.
69. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1492-PRESENT
308 (citing the average for 1899-1903). See generally LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN
MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW (1998).
70. The structures of racial domination and subordination were not dismantled when
Plessy was overturned in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), or by passage
of the civil rights acts of the 1960s; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.). Brown recognized the inherently subordinating nature of legally segregated
public accommodations and institutions, but it did not address the social, economic, or
political realities of a people who had been stripped of their national identities and were
still suffering a form of internal colonialism. See generally Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24
CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992). Nearly fifty years later, for the most part, public schools
remain segregated. See generally GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996).
71. Nearly thirty percent of African Americans have incomes below the official
poverty line, with forty percent in actual poverty. See Clarence Lusane, Persisting
Disparities: Globalization and the Economic Status of African Americans, 42 How. L.J.
431, 434-35 (1999). Median black household income is about two-thirds that of white
households, and the disparity in wealth, rather than income, is even greater. Id. at 435.
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explicitly declares African Americans to be outside the protection of the
Constitution, as is the case for certain groups whom the Supreme Court
has declared to be subject to the plenary power of the U.S. government. 72
The plenary power doctrine was first enunciated with respect to
American Indian nations, immigrants, and the United States'
"extraterritorial" colonies in a series of cases decided by the Supreme
Court between 1886 and 1903, the same period in which it decided Plessy
v. Ferguson. By the late 1800s, the United States had consolidated
control over the territory now identified as the forty-eight contiguous
states. The Civil War had successfully prevented southern secession, and
the sweeping social changes initiated during Reconstruction had been
rolled back.73 With the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the United States
had annexed the northern half of Mexico in 1848.74 By 1869, the east and
west coasts were connected by the transcontinental railroad; by 1877,
virtually all Indian land was in settler hands as a result of the making and
breaking of treaties, ongoing military campaigns, and the extermination
of civilian populations.75 According to Howard Zinn, in the "year of the
massacre at Wounded Knee, 1890, it was officially declared by the
Bureau of the Census that the internal frontier was closed." 76
The powers of the state-legislative, executive, and judicial-then
turned to two broad areas of concern. First, what was the place of those
deemed "other" within American society, and how would they be kept in
their place? Second, to what extent would the United States follow the
path of European imperialism and continue to expand overseas? The
Court addressed these issues in seminal decisions regarding American
The role played by the law is most vividly illustrated by the fact that two-thirds of all "non-
white" men are arrested and jailed before they turn thirty, and they are three-and-one-half
times more likely than their white counterparts to have a felony arrest. See JEROME G.
MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (1996); see also MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 118-41
(1999).
72. However, in light of the dramatic disparities in incarceration rates, see supra note
71, the government's exercise of plenary authority over prisoners may be the most
effective way in which the plenary power doctrine is, in fact, extended to African
Americans and other persons of color.
73. See ZINN, supra note 69, at 124-289.
74. See RODOLFO ACUf A, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS 5-133
(3d ed. 1988); see also Guadalupe T. Luna, On the Complexities of Race: The Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691, 692-93 (1999)
(drawing parallels between the legal treatment of Chicanas/os and African Americans).
75. See generally CHARLES C. ROYCE, INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES: 18TH ANNUAL REPORT, 1896-97 (1899) (two volumes).
76. See ZINN, supra note 69, at 290. See generally DAVID SVALDI, SAND CREEK AND
THE RHETORIC OF EXTERMINATION (1989).
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Indians, from United States v. Kagama77 through Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock;78 immigrants, starting with the Chinese Exclusion Case;79 and
colonial subjects, in the Insular Cases beginning with Downes v.
Bidwell."'
The plenary power doctrine is a cornerstone of what is called federal
Indian law." By 1871, when Congress officially suspended treaty making
with American Indian nations, the United States had entered into
approximately 800 treaties with Indian nations, 400 ratified and another
400 unratified.8 Initially, the U.S. government took the clear position
that these were agreements with independent sovereigns."' Indeed, in its
early years, the United States was militarily weak and eager to be
accepted as a legitimate state by European countries that did not look
kindly upon colonies declaring their independence. As such, it wanted
both the specific benefits embodied in the treaties with Indian nations
and the recognition of legitimacy they implied.84 As Siegfried Weissner
stated:
[T]here is no credible way to interpret out of existence the fact
that the budding new player in the international arena of the
18th and 19th century, the United States, for whatever reason,
77. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
78. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
79. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
80. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
81. The term "federal Indian law" is a misnomer because Indian nations have had
and continue to have their own law that is quite distinct from that of the United States.
See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 1 (1998) ("'Indian Law' might be
better termed 'Federal Law About Indians"'). For an example of actual Indian law, see
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR. LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY
VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 (1999).
82. See INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1940-41)
(five volumes), for a compilation of ratified treaties, and VINE DELORIA, JR. &
RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES,
AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1775-1979 (1999) (two volumes), for documents
omitted by Kappler. In the years since 1871, the United States has entered into hundreds
of agreements that acknowledge some degree of Indian sovereignty. See INDIAN
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES supra; DELORIA & DEMALLIE, supra. The United
States continues to acknowledge indigenous sovereignty when it directly benefits U.S.
interests, as do its agreements with federally approved and funded "tribal governments" to
permit the extraction of radioactive materials or the storage of hazardous wastes on Indian
reservations. See generally Ward Churchill, Geographies of Sacrifice: The Radioactive
Colonization of Native North America, in STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND: NATIVE NORTH
AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION 239-92 (1999).
83. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty, in
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 22-28 (Roxanne
Dunbar Ortiz & Larry Emerson eds., 1979).
84. Id.
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did enter into treaties of friendship and alliance on a perfectly
level playing field with the Indian nations. It treated them with
the same respect, extending to them the same courtesies as to
other nations of the then overwhelmingly European
international legal order."
However, as its relative military power grew, the U.S. government
more and more frequently imposed its will on the hundreds of indigenous
nations it encountered, violating both its treaties and more generally
applicable international law. 6 The legal rationalization for such actions
emerged from a trilogy of opinions authored by Chief Justice Marshall in
the 1820s and 30s: Johnson v. M'Intosh' Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,8
and Worcester v. GeorgiaY.8  Although these cases continue to be cited to
support the complete subordination of Indian nations, Chief Justice
Marshall's assertions actually were much more limited.!'
85. Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567, 591 (1995).
86. Id. at 584. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1990); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE (1997).
87. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
88. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1(1831).
89. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
90. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 382,
406-18 (1993) (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall struck a relatively coherent balance
between colonialism and constitutionalism that is overlooked by contemporary
commentators); Helen W. Winston, "An Anomaly Unknown". Supreme Court Application
of International Law Norms on Indigenous Rights in the Cherokee Cases (1831-32), 1
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 339, 349-58 (1994) (analyzing the cases in the context of
international law as articulated by early international law theorists Hugo Grotius and
Emmerich de Vattel). In Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall used the "doctrine of discovery"
to justify U.S. occupation of Indian lands, but he recognized that the doctrine only gave
the "discovering" colonial power a preemptive right to obtain the land either by purchase
from a willing indigenous seller or by lawful conquest. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 587; see also
Newton, supra note 21, at 209, 248. As Newton points out, this doctrine was dramatically
misstated by Chief Justice Taney, author of the Dred Scott opinion, in United States v.
Rogers. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571 (1846) (claiming that the doctrine negated Indian
ownership interests in their land and subjected them to U.S. political authority); see also
Newton, supra note 2 1, at 209-11.
As Marshall said in Johnson, "[clonquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror
cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be,
respecting the original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted," Johnson,
21 U.S. at 588. One of the many problems with this argument is the fact that most of the
Indian land had not been taken by conquest, yet Marshall did not restrict his argument to
those indigenous nations that had been "conquered." See id. In fact, he extended it to all
Indians in the territories to which the United States envisioned itself as extending --
nations that had not as of yet seen, or perhaps even heard of, white settlers, much less the
United States government. See id. at 588-89. Marshall clarified in Worcester that
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In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall repudiated Georgia's claim of
jurisdiction over Cherokee lands and acknowledged:
From the commencement of our government, congress has
passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians;
which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a
firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate.
All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force,
manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct
political communities, having territorial boundaries, within
which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the
lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged,
but guaranteed by the United States.9
However, the previous year, he had asserted in Cherokee Nation that
Indian nations were neither independent foreign countries nor states of
the Union, unilaterally declaring them to be "domestic dependent
nations" whose "relation to the United States resemble[d] that of a ward
to his guardian."' g This characterization, which had no basis in either
international or domestic law, has been used to justify continued
assertion of plenary power by Congress.93 According to Nell Newton:
Both Johnson and the Cherokee Cases were concerned with
upholding federal supremacy in Indian affairs over states and
individuals. The federal goal was to obtain cessions of land and
to ensure peace ... by promises of protection from outsiders
meddling with Indian land or sovereignty. From these two
concepts-property interest and guardianship-the Court in the
late nineteenth century gradually developed a guardianship
power over Indian tribes, which it frankly acknowledged to be
extraconstitutional.94
In the id-1800s, in clear violation of its treaty obligations, the U.S.
government forcibly removed not only the Cherokee but virtually all
"conquest" was only legitimate in the context of a "just" war, which, in turn, required
Indian aggression. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 545-47; see also Newton, supra note 21, at 248.
International law at that time recognized a right of conquest, but only under particular
terms, most of which the United States had not followed. See infra notes 116-17 and
accompanying text.
91. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 556-57.
92. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
93. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 699 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)) (explaining that "[b]y becoming
'domestic dependent nations,' Indian tribes were divested of any power to determine their
external relations").
94. Newton, supra note 21, at 207 (footnotes omitted).
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eastern Indian nations onto reservations west of the Mississippi River.9
By the 1880s, most indigenous resistance had been crushed, and the
white settlers pressed for complete control over American Indian
peoples as well as their land and resources. The Major Crimes Act of
1885 was a significant step toward settler control, asserting federal
jurisdiction for the first time over certain crimes committed by Indians on
reservations, whether or not within the boundaries of a state.6 In United
States v. Kagama, the Supreme Court upheld the Act, holding that the
United States could exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians and that
constitutionally such power rested with the federal, not state,
government.7 The Kagama Court began by declaring that Indian nations
had not been truly sovereign since the Cherokee Cases of the 1830s but
were "semi-independent" with limited authority over their "internal and
social relations."98 The Court acknowledged that the Constitution did
not explicitly delegate jurisdiction over Indian affairs to the federal
government, and the Court fell back on the argument that such power
must be inherent." It relied on cases that dealt with Congress' power to
regulate territories that had not yet become states and drew on Chief
Justice Marshall's earlier pronouncement that "[t]he right to govern may
be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory."""
Shortly after Kagama, Congress passed the Allotment Act, which was
designed to break up what remained of Indian land and political
organization by "extinguishing Indian tribal lands, allotting the same in
severalty among those entitled to receive them, and distributing Indian
tribal funds."'"" The Act required any individual who accepted allotted
land to accept U.S. citizenship, even though the Supreme Court had held
the year before that Indians were not citizens by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment."2  Despite tremendous Indian resistance, the federal
95. See Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes,
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 136 (2002) (discussing the Removal Act of 1830); Richard White,
How Andrew Jackson Saved the Cherokees, 5 GREEN BAG 443, 444 (2002) (noting
Jackson's use of the national security argument to remove Indians to the west of the
Mississippi).
96. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885).
97. 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886).
98. Id. at 381-82.
99. Id. at 378.
100. Id. at 380 (quoting Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828)).
101. Seminole Nation v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 455, 466 (1933).
102. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884).
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government took collectively held lands, allotted the worst portions to
individual Indians, and sold the "surplus" to white settlers.'03
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock' 4 was a suit brought by a Kiowa band chief
who accepted an allotment under coercion and then tried to halt the
assignment of allotments.]° Lone Wolf argued that the Allotment Act
violated both the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge, which provided that
any alienation of Kiowa land required the consent of three-quarters of
the nation's adult men, and the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment"'O With respect to the due process claim, the Court asserted
that "[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been
exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always
been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial
department of the government," a position not supported by history or
by Justice Marshall's opinions. °7 On the treaty claim, the Court relied on
the "last-in-time" rule to hold that the Allotment Act overrode the treaty
for purposes of judicial enforcement.)
The practical effect of the invocation of the plenary power doctrine in
Lone Wolf was that between 1887 and 1934, American Indian nations
lost ninety million acres of reservation land, which constituted more than
two-thirds of their holdings.' 9 Blue Clark stated:
Loss of land, lack of rental and lease income, and few
marketable skills left the Kiowa deeply impoverished by the
1920s, with an unemployment rate among Kiowa males above
sixty percent, establishing a pattern that persists down to the
103. See CLARK, supra note 59, at 2 ("After removal from their homelands earlier in
the century, allotment was the most traumatic federal policy affecting Indian people."); see
also WILKINS, supra note 21, at 65-117. In other challenges to the Allotment Act, the
Court held that the plenary power allowed Indian property, even land held in fee simple,
to be "subject to the administrative control of the government," due to the Indians'
"condition of dependency." Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902); see
also Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 488 (1899).
104. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
105. CLARK, supra note 59, at 2.
106. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 561.
107. See id. at 565.
108. See id. at 568.
109. Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 16 (1934) (memorandum of John Collier), reprinted in D. GETCHES, R.
ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 73-75 (1979). Kiowa, Comanche,
and Apache landholdings went from just under 160 acres per capita in the 1880s to 17
acres in 1934. CLARK, supra note 59, at 95.
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present. The Lone Wolf decision cast a whole people into an
economic coma. All the Indians became a casualty."
What is the source of this plenary power over Indian nations?
Sometimes it is attributed to the "Indian Commerce Clause," the
provision of the Constitution -the only one explicitly mentioning Indian
affairs-that gives Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes. '1 ' This was the position asserted in 1989 by Justice Stevens in
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico when he said that "the central
function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with
plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs."'"2 However, the
history of the clause clearly indicates that it was intended as an internal
delegation of power to ensure that relations with Indian nations were
handled by federal rather than state government."3 In fact, it is a
recognition that Indian nations are separate from the United States, and
are therefore entities with whom the United States can engage in
commerce, rather than a delegation of power over Indians.
A second source proffered for the plenary power doctrine is the
federal government's control over "territories" that are not states.
However, even if "[t]he right to govern may be the inevitable
consequence of the right to acquire territory,"' 14 what is the source of the
right to acquire? Federal jurisdiction over territories purportedly comes
from Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which states that
"Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States.""' 5 However, this does not address how territory can be
acquired, or whether the United States can hold territory it does not
intend to incorporate into the Union. In any case, territory can only be
lawfully acquired under international law-the law recognized by Chief
Justice Marshall and other jurists of the day-by treaty or by conquest in
110. CLARK, supra note 59, at 96. The government's attorney in Lone Wolf, Willis
Van Devanter, was subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court by President Taft in
1911. Id. at 101. He was the author of United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 601 (1916),
which held that an enfranchised Indian could still be subject to the plenary power of
Congress. WILKINS, supra note 21, at 25 ("Nice served to seal the status of tribal Indians
in perpetual legal and political limbo.").
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
112. 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
113. See Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REv. 77, 119-20,119 n.139 (1993).
114. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511,542 (1828).
115. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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a "just" war.'16 In this case, a just war could only have been waged in
response to unprovoked aggression by the Indian nations, and none of
the military campaigns waged against Indian nations fit this description.
7
Thus, the United States could only acquire territory lawfully by treaty,
and the acquisition only remains lawful if the United States complies
with treaty terms.
Most assertions of plenary power over Indians depend upon an
argument that it is based on powers "inherent in sovereignty.""'
However, the Constitution provides that only the President, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, can enter into treaties," 9 and
treaties are by definition agreements between sovereign entities.2 '
Therefore, recognition of U.S. sovereignty over lawfully acquired
territory requires concomitant recognition of the sovereignty of the
nations from which the territory was obtained."' Thus, each of the
commonly accepted justifications for the exercise of plenary power over
Indian nations falls apart under scrutiny. A more honest explanation is
the Supreme Court's conclusion in Kagama that authority over Indians
"must exist in [the federal] government, because it never has existed
anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is within the
geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been
116. As discussed in supra, note 90, the discovery doctrine did not justify the taking of
land; it only clarified the relative rights of colonizing powers to negotiate with the
indigenous owners.
117. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 58-63 (2d ed. 1992) (describing the "legalist paradigm" of
aggression as justification for war); Ward Churchill, Perversions of Justice: Examining the
Doctrine of U.S. Rights to Occupancy in North America, in WARD CHURCHILL READER
(forthcoming 2002) (on file with author) (applying the theory to the United States
context). See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 86. For the U.S. government's position, see
FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1981) (reprinting 1942 ed.).
11& See, e.g., supra notes 99-100 and infra note 213 and accompanying text.
119. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the President the "Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties").
120. A treaty is defined as any "international agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2, § 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 333. In addition, the Constitution
forbids states to enter into treaties. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter
into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation."). Therefore, the federal government cannot
enter into treaties with states or, presumably, any other of its own political subdivisions.
See id.
121. However, the United States' willingness to disregard international law was
articulated clearly in Cherokee Tobacco, which upheld a congressional decision to pass an
act in violation of a treaty "as if the treaty were not an element to be considered."
Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870); see also CLARK, supra note 59, at
14.
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denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes" '12 - an
argument remarkably close to "might makes right."
The plenary power doctrine is also integral to U.S. immigration law.
As a sparsely populated and fairly weak settler state, for nearly a century
the United States encouraged immigration from northern and western
Europe.'2 However, after it succeeded in occupying what became the
"lower 48" states, tensions emerged between those who wanted to
encourage international trade and the importation of cheap labor,
especially after the abolition of slavery, and those who wanted to protect
"American" (i.e., white) workers.'24 In 1868, the United States and China
entered into the Burlingame Treaty, an agreement that, among other
things, guaranteed unfettered migration and invoked the "inherent and
inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and ... the
mutual advantage of... free migration."'2 The following year, however,
the transcontinental railroad was completed, and shortly thereafter the
country found itself in an economic depression. With rising
unemployment among both Chinese and American workers, Congress
was pressured to restrict immigration. 26 In 1882, Congress suspended the
immigration of new Chinese workers for ten years and, in 1884, enacted a
law that required Chinese residents leaving the United States to obtain
certificates of re-entry.'
27
Chae Chan Ping, who had lived in the United States for twelve years,
obtained such a certificate and left the country.'28 In 1888, just before his
return, Congress enacted legislation precluding the entry of all Chinese
122. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).
123. There was no federal regulation of immigration until 1875, but there were
attempts by individual states to restrict immigration. See generally Gerald L. Neuman,
The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993).
124. See RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF
ASIAN AMERICANS 98-99 (1989); ELMER CLARENCE SANDMEYER, THE ANTI-CHINESE
MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 57-77 (1991).
125. Treaty With China, June 28, 1868, U.S.-China, art. V, 16 Stat. 739, 740
[hereinafter Burlingame Treaty]; see also T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 180-81 (4th ed. 1998).
126. See Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Immigration
Policy and the National Interest, Staff Report (1981), reprinted in ALEINIKOFF, ET AL.,
supra note 125, at 152, 158. See generally ENTRY DENIED: EXCLUSION AND THE
CHINESE COMMUNITY IN AMERICA, 1882-1.943 (Sucheng Chan ed., 1991).
127. In 1880, the United States had convinced China to amend the Burlingame Treaty
by allowing the United States to "regulate, limit or suspend" the immigration of additional
Chinese laborers while promising that those who were already in the U.S. could "go and
come of their own free will." Motomura, supra note 21, at 550.
128. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889).
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laborers, regardless of whether they held re-entry certificates.19  Chae
Chan Ping challenged the 1888 law as a violation of the Burlingame
Treaty and Fifth Amendment due process. 34 Writing for the Court,
Justice Field noted that the statute conflicted with the treaty but would
nonetheless be enforced under the "last in time" rule.' Addressing the
constitutional question, the Court held that Congress had the power to
regulate immigration, a power not explicitly referenced in the
Constitution, and that the courts would not intervene because that power
emanated from the government's prerogatives over national security,
territorial sovereignty, and self-preservation. 3 2
In 1892, Congress extended the ban on the immigration of Chinese
laborers and provided that a worker already in the U.S. could stay only if
he obtained a certificate of residency.'33 The certificate had to be based
on the testimony of a credible white witness. 34 In Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, the Supreme Court rejected the claims of three Chinese
workers who were acknowledged to be long-term residents but had no
white witnesses to testify on their behalf.' Justice Gray extended
Congress' plenary power from the exclusion of those first arriving to the
deportation of permanent residents,'36 and he refused to characterize
deportation as punishment that would trigger heightened constitutional
scrutiny.'37 Three dissenters argued that some constitutional protections
should apply, but no one questioned Congress' right to exclude on the
basis of race or nationality.3 '
In the meantime, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 139 the Court
upheld an immigration officer's determination to exclude a Japanese
woman without a hearing because she was likely to become a "public
129. Id.
130. See id. at 589-90.
131. Id. at 600. Under the "last in time" rule, if there is an irreconcilable conflict
between a treaty obligation and a federal statute, federal courts enforce that which is most
recent. See supra note 15.
132. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606. According to Justice Field, if Congress
"considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not
assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security.... [Congress'] determination
is conclusive upon the judiciary." Id.
133. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 699 n.1 (1893).
134. Id. at 700 n.1.
135. Id. at 732.
136. Id. at 713-14, 723-24.
137. See id. at 733-34 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
13& See id. at 732-34 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
139. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
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charge.'' Justice Gray wrote, "It is an accepted maxim of international
law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and
upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. 14 The Court then
extended plenary power from substantive to procedural immigration
matters with the perplexing statement that while would-be immigrants
possessed some due process rights, they extended only so far as Congress
should declare."2 Thus, in immigration law, the plenary power doctrine
is explicitly grounded in the notion that the United States' existence as a
sovereign state gives it the power and the right to exclude noncitizens on
any ground and in any manner it chooses and that the courts will not
interfere to impose any constitutional limitations on the exercise of that
power.
Shortly after it established the plenary power doctrine with respect to
American Indian nations and immigrants, the Supreme Court extended
application of the doctrine to the United States' acquisition of external
possessions."' As soon as the "interior frontier" was declared closed in
1890,' 44 politicians began to debate whether the United States should
continue to expand by acquiring external territories; in other words, they
debated whether the United States should become an explicitly
imperialist power.145 In 1893, using strategies much like those used to
acquire Texas,' 46 American businessmen, backed by the United States
Marines, overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy and installed a republican
government, which the United States quickly recognized. 147 After a half-
140. Id. at 661.
141. Id. at 659.
142. See id. at 660 ("As to [foreigners], the decisions of executive or administrative
officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.").
143. For a thorough compilation of the history, law, and current status of U.S.
territories, see ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE
ANALYSIS OF UNTIED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS (1989).
144. Seesupra note 76.
145. McKinley's election in 1900 was generally perceived as a mandate for
imperialism. See Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the
Domestic.- The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in FOREIGN
IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 4 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001); STUART
CREIGHTON MILLER, "BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION": THE AMERICAN CONQUEST OF
THE PHILIPPINES, 1899-1903 21-27 (1982).
146. See ACURIA, supra note 74, at 9-12, 25-53 (describing the "invasion" and
"colonization of Texas").
147. When the United States did not immediately annex Hawai'i, Roosevelt called it
"a crime against white civilization." ZINN, supra note 69, at 293. Hawai'i was annexed in
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century of territorial status, Hawai'i was incorporated into the United
States. As a result, Native Hawaiians are subjected to many of the
violations of international law faced by residents of the unincorporated
territories, but their position within the domestic legal structure is
somewhat different. The government does not claim to be exercising
plenary power over them; rather, it leaves them with only the remedies
available under the Constitution, thus giving them no legal forum in
which to pursue their right to self-determination. 48
The territories occupied by the United States that have not been
incorporated have been subjected to the plenary power doctrine. During
the late 1800s, the peoples of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines
each struggled to gain their independence from Spanish colonialism 49
They had almost succeeded in 1898 when the United States stepped in,
declared war on Spain, and claimed the Spanish territories. xS As a result,
rather than gaining their independence, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and
the Philippines were "ceded" by Spain to the United States under a
treaty that provided that "[t]he civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants . . . shall be determined by the [United States]
1898 pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress known as the Newlands Resolution. Joint
Resolution To Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, Pub. L.
No. 55-55, 30 Stat. 750 (July 7, 1898); see also Chris K. Iijima, Race over Rice: Binary
Analytical Boxes and a Twenty-First Century Endorsement of Nineteenth Century
Imperialism in Rice v. Cayetano, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 91,103-08 (2000); HAUNANI-KAY
TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'I 16
(2d ed. 1998) ("Once the Republic of Hawai'i declared itself on July 4, 1894, the
'Americanization' of Hawai'i was sealed like a coffin."). See generally Lisa Cami Oshiro,
Recognizing No Konaka Maoli's Right to Self-Determination, 25 N.M. L. REV. 65 (1995).
148. Although Congress officially "apologized" in 1993 for the illegal overthrow of the
Hawaiian government, the United States continues to disregard Native Hawaiian rights to
self-determination, a subject beyond the scope of this article. See generally TRASK, supra
note 147, at 76-79; ISLANDS IN CAPTIVITY: THE RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS HAWAIIANS (Sharon Venne & Ward
Churchill eds., forthcoming 2002), at http://www.southendpress.org; Michael Caroll, Every
Man Has a Right to Decide His Own Destiny: The Development of Native Hawaiian Self-
Determination as Compared to Self-Determination of Native Alaskans and the People of
Puerto Rico, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 639 (2000); Jon M. Van Dyke et al., Self-
Determination for Nonself-governing Peoples and for Indigenous Peoples: The Cases of
Guam and Hawai'i, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 623 (1996).
149. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargos, History, Legal Scholarship, and Latcrit Theory: The
Case of Racial Transformation Circa the Spanish American War, 1896-1900, 78 DENV. U.L.
REV. 921, 923-28 (2001).
150. Jos6 A. Cabranes, Some Common Ground, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE:
PUERTO RiCO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 39 (Christina Duffy
Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001); ZINN, supra note 69, at 302.
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Congress.' 15' Because Congress had just passed a resolution declaring
that Cuba would not be annexed, the United States did not invade Cuba,
controlling it instead through political, military, and economic means."'
The United States did, however, take direct possession of Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Philippines.
53
There was strong indigenous resistance to American occupation of the
Philippines."' In what was frequently described as an "Indian war,'
5
American troops had official directives to kill all males over the age of
ten.' -6 American troops massacred the population of entire villages and
burned them to the ground, tortured and murdered prisoners of war,
raped women, and looted'57 in the name of the "pacification" and the
"benevolent assimilation" of a people officially "believed to be incapable
of any considerable degree of civilization or advancement.'
158
As U.S. lawmakers turned their attention to the legal status of these
"territories," they looked to their colonial experience with Indians for
legal as well as military precedent.'59 Speaking in the Senate on how the
United States was to govern the Philippines, Henry Cabot Lodge, a
leading advocate of racially restrictive immigration policies, reached back
151. Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, 30 Stat. 1754, 1759; see Jose Trias Monge, Plenary
Power and the Principle of Liberty: An Alternative View of the Political Condition of
Puerto Rico, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 1-3 (1999).
152. The Teller Amendment to the joint resolution declaring war disclaimed any
intent to exercise U.S. sovereignty over Cuba beyond ensuring its "pacification." J. Res.
24, 55th Cong. (2d sess.), 30 Stat. 738, 739 (1898). See Lazos Vargas, supra note 149, at
928; Mark S. Weiner, Teutonic Constitutionalism, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE:
PUERTO Rico, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 64 (Christina Duffy
Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
153. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 149.
154. See THE PHILIPPINES READER: A HISTORY OF COLONIALISM,
NEOCOLONIALISM, DICTATORSHIP, AND RESISTANCE 5-33 (Daniel B. Schirmer &
Stephen Rosskamm Shalon eds., 1987) (estimating that a million Filipinos were killed and
hundreds of villages burned to the ground). See generally MILLER, supra note 145.
155. See MILLER, supra note 145, at 196-21.8.
156. See THE PHILIPPINES READER, supra note 154, at 17.
157. See ZINN, supra note 69, at 306-11; MILLER, supra note 145, at 196-218. The
purported justification for such atrocities, as with the atrocities committed against
American Indians, was that these were not "civilized peoples," and therefore, the rules of
civilized warfare did not apply; however, "[i]n the Philippines, Americans often seemed
very much like their own worst image of the Malay savage: a people without law."
Weiner, supra note 152, at 74.
158. Weiner, supra note 152, at 67.
159. See MILLER, supra note 145, at 219 (noting that General Smith, who gave orders
to "kill and burn, kill and burn" and ordered the massacre of civilians over age ten, was a
veteran of the 1890 Wounded Knee massacre).
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to Justice Marshall's decisions justifying federal Indian policy in the
Cherokee cases."" In Clark's words, Lodge "summarized imperialists'
views when he stated that national Supreme Court decisions declared
that 'the United States could have under its control ... a 'domestic
dependent nation,' thereby solving for all time in his mind 'the question
of our constitutional relations to the Philippines and other territories.'
6
1
A similar policy was followed in Puerto Rico, which the United States• 162
occupied without significant military resistance. In 1901, the Supreme
Court directly confronted the meaning of its territorial status in Downes
v. Bidwell.16 This was the first of the Insular Cases decided between 1901
and 192216' and involved a challenge to U.S. duties levied on Puerto
Rican goods at a percentage of the rate levied on similar "foreign"
goods.' 6 According to the plaintiffs, if Puerto Rico was not a foreign
country, it must have been part of the United States, and thus the
Commerce Clause precluded any duties at all. 66
Downes "caused more turmoil on the Supreme Court than any case
since Dred Scott"'67 and generated five separate opinions. 61 The debate
is sometimes characterized as a debate over whether the Constitution
"follows the flag," that is, whether constitutional protections are co-
extensive with U.S. jurisdiction.' 69 Justice Brown, who had authored the
majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson just five years earlier, wrote "for
160. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
161. CLARK, supra note 59, at 102. Similarly, President McKinley instructed U.S.
officials in the Philippines to "adopt the same course" used in dealing with American
Indians, permitting only very limited and closely supervised local self-government. Id. at
103.
162. See Rafael A. Declet, Jr., The Mandate Under International Law for a Status, and
the Right of U.S.-Resident Puerto Ricans to Participate, 28 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMM.
19,27 (2001).
163. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
164. While there is some dispute over which cases constitute the "Insular Cases," there
is general agreement that they start with Downes and continue through Balzac v. People
of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305, 313-14 (1922), which held that the Jones Act, 39 Stat. 951
(1917), which conferred U.S. citizenship but not representation on Puerto Ricans, did not
"incorporate" Puerto Rico into the United States. For an in-depth analysis of these cases,
see Efrdn Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular
Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U. P.R. 225 (1996); see also EFREN RIVERA RAMOS,
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF
AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO 71-142 (2001).
165. Rivera Ramos, Colonialism, supra note 164, at 247-48.
166. Id. at 248-49.
167. Cabranes, supra note 150, at 42 (quoting Frederic R. Coudert, The Evolution of
the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, AM. U. L. REV. 60, 801, 840 (1926)).
168. See generally Downes, 182 U.S. at 244.
169. For critiques of this phrasing, see Cabranes, supra note 150, at 32 n.44.
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the Court" even though no other justice joined his opinion.17 According
to Justice Brown, Congress had complete discretion over whether to
extend the Constitution to the territories and was bound only to
recognize the "natural" rights of the inhabitants.'
"The power to acquire territory by treaty," he stated, "implies not only
the power to govern such territory, but to prescribe upon what terms the
United States will receive its inhabitants, and what their status shall be in
what Chief Justice Marshall termed the 'American Empire.""" In sum,
the plenary power of Congress arose from the inherent right to acquire
territory, the Territorial Clause,'73 the treaty-making power.74 and the
power to declare and conduct war.'75 The Constitution applied to the
territories only to the degree that it was extended to them by Congress. 76
As to the probability of despotism resulting from such plenary power, the
inhabitants of the new territories should not fear: "There are certain
principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character which
need no expression in constitutions or statutes to give them effect or to
secure dependencies against legislation manifestly hostile to their real
interests. '77
The legal theory that ultimately had the most influence was that of
Justice White, who said in his concurrence that the applicability of the
Constitution rested on whether a particular territory had been
"incorporated" into the United States.' If it were "unincorporated,"
according to White, the inhabitants possessed only certain
"fundamental" rights. 79  He thus created a "twilight zone" status
comparable to that of Marshall's "domestic dependent nation":
[W]hilst in an international sense Porto Rico [sic] was not a
foreign country, since it was subject to the sovereignty of and
170. Downes, 182 U.S. at 247.
171. Id. at 279.
172. Id.
173. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
174. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; art. 11, § 2, cl. 1.
176. Downes, 182 U.S. at 278-79.
177. Rivera Ramos, Colonialism, supra note 164, at 246-47 (citing Downes, 182 U.S. at
280). Justice Brown went on to reassure the people that the fact that the Court had only
once overturned congressional action in the territories was evidence that Congress could
be trusted to act in good faith - that instance being Dred Scott, in which Justice Taney
held the Missouri Compromise invalid on the ground that Congress could not prevent
citizens from taking their property from one U.S. jurisdiction to another. See Downes, 182
U.S. at 280; see also supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
178. Downes, 182 U.S. at 288 (White, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 291 (White, J., concurring).
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owned by the United States, it was foreign to the United States
in a domestic sense, because the island had not been
incorporated into the United States, but was merely
appurtenant thereto as a possession.'8°
Justice White's distinction between incorporation and possession
allowed the Court to rationalize the possession of external territory and
the concomitant control of its peoples without constitutional restrictions
on the treatment of those people or the disposition of their territory. As
Judge Cabranes stated, "[i]t is fair to say that it was devised in order to
make colonialism possible."'' 1 The dissenters characterized both Justice
White and Justice Brown's positions as theories of extraconstitutional
governmental power.1" Justice Harlan warned:
It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of a
government outside of the supreme law of the land finds
lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty
rests upon this court than to exert its full authority to prevent
all violation of the principles of the Constitution.
Nonetheless, the plenary power doctrine, which had already been used
to violate the principles of the Constitution in immigration and Indian
law, was now firmly ensconced in "territorial law" as well.' As Blue
Clark noted:
Lone Wolf occurred just at the peak of American patriotic
fervor over acquisition of new overseas territories from Spain..
. . The decree summarized America's approach to island
peoples acquired in the takeover of Spanish colonial
180. Id. at 341-42.
181. Cabranes, supra note 150, at 43.
182. Downes, 182 U.S. at 374-75 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 382.
184. Reflecting the consensus among the Justices that Puerto Ricans were distinctly
"other," Jose Trias Monge says that the plenary power doctrine articulated in Downes
"flowed from the holding in Plessy v. Ferguson." Monge, supra note 151, at 4. Even
Justice Harlan said in his dissent that "[w]hether a particular race will or will not
assimilate with our people, and whether they can or cannot with safety to our institutions
be brought within the operation of the Constitution, is a matter to be thought of when it is
proposed to acquire their territory by treaty, A mistake in the acquisition of territory...
cannot be made the ground for violating the Constitution." Downes, 182 U.S. at 384
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Blue Clark notes:
In chambers, it may have been Justice William Moody's lurid story graphically
depicting the consequences of twelve tattooed savage chieftains filing into a jury
room, resting their spears and war trophies against the wall, and deliberating
evidence in a jury trial that swept the other justices along into supporting White's
Insular Doctrine.
CLARK, supra note 59, at 104 (citing ROBERT B. HIGHSAW, EDWARD DOUGLAS WHITE:
DEFENDER OF THE CONSERVATIVE FAITH (1981)).
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possessions after 1898. The subject status of the ward in Lone
Wolf became the colonial status of the overseas dependent of
the Insular Cases. . . . A process of colonial political
incorporation and land expropriation on ocean possessions such
as the Hawaiian Islands similar to the American Indian
experience rapidly took place, leaving the native populace
subordinate and increasingly landless."
The following Section traces these original plenary power cases into
contemporary U.S. jurisprudence and considers some of the resulting
violations of human rights that are allowed to go unredressed by U.S.
courts.
III. CONTEMPORARY VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
EXERCISE OF PLENARY POWER
The cases establishing the plenary power doctrine, from the Chinese
Exclusion Cases to Kagama and Lone Wolf to the Insular Cases, would
be historical anomalies except that they continue to provide the legal
basis for the continued subordination of immigrants, American Indians,
and residents of "unincorporated" territories controlled by the United
States. As U.S. jurisprudence struggles to balance its image of itself as a
nation of laws' with its desire to maintain structures of colonization, the
legal justifications enunciated a century ago for the exercise of
extraconstitutional and apparently unlimited power over these peoples
continue to be the basis for judicial deference to governmental policies
that violate their basic human rights."" Justice Harlan, dissenting in
Hawaii v. Mankichi, warned that application of the plenary power
[w]ould mean that the United States may acquire territory by
cession, conquest or treaty, and that Congress may exercise
sovereign dominion over it, outside of and in violation of the
Constitution. . . . Thus will be engrafted upon our republican
institutions ... a colonial system entirely foreign to the genius
of our Government and abhorrent to the principles that
underlie and pervade the Constitution .... [W]e will have two
governments over the peoples subject to the jurisdiction of the
185. CLARK, supra note 59, at 101-02.
186. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The government of
the United States has emphatically been termed a government of laws, not of men.").
187. See Frickey, supra note 90, at 383 ("In a country that prides itself on following the
rule of law, the justifications for colonization uttered by those European explorers and
recognized by the Supreme Court itself - to impose Christianity upon the heathen, to
make more productive use of natural resources, and so on - do not go down easily in the
late-twentieth century.") (footnote omitted).
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United States, one, existing under a written Constitution,
creating a government with authority to exercise only powers
expressly granted; ... the other, existing outside of the written
Constitution, in virtue of an unwritten law to be declared from
time to time by Congress, which is itself only a creature of that
instrument.)I
This is, in fact, what has happened. This Section considers some of the
contemporary results of the dual system of government foreseen by
Justice Harlan and briefly summarizes some of the violations of
international human rights law that result from these policies.
Under the rubric of exercising its "plenary power" over American
Indian nations, a power said to derive from its existence as a sovereign
nation, the United States has denied to the Indians within its borders
their right to self-determination as acknowledged by international law; to
basic human rights guaranteed all persons under international law; and to
protections mandated by the Constitution. First, it must be noted that
the United States has violated the terms of every one of the
approximately eight hundred treaties, ratified and unratified, that it
imposed upon Indian nations; yet, it continues to use those treaties to
justify its occupation of Indian lands. 89 Bringing "federal Indian law"
into compliance with international law would first require enforcing the
treaties that exist between the United States and Indian nations and
interpreting them in accordance with customary international law and
the principles articulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.' 90 As Siegfried Wiessner stated:
The fact that treaties with Indian nations can be abrogated
under Lone Wolf does not stand in the way of their
characterization as obligations under international law ...
Traditional international law scholarship, applied in intellectual
honesty, would have a hard time denying commitments arising
from U.S.-Indian treaties the effect of international legal
obligations.'9'
Weissner concluded that these treaties are still enforceable under
international law, particularly in light of the 1975 advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice on the status of the Western Sahara, which
188. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 239-40 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in
Rivera-Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism, The Insular Cases (1901-
1922), 65 REV. JUR. U. P.R. 225, 318-19 (1996).
189. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES:
AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1985).
190. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 19.
191. Wiessner, supra note 85, at 584,591.
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confirmed the "international legal effect of agreements between




Weissner also noted that the treaties must be interpreted in accordance
with the provisions of the Vienna Convention, which differs significantly
from U.S. domestic law interpreting treaties with Indian nations and
means that judicially-created doctrines cannot be invoked to avoid their
enforcement. '93
Instead of interpreting treaties in accordance with the provisions of the
Vienna Convention, courts continue to invoke the plenary power
doctrine as justification for ongoing violations of those treaties and for
treatment that violates customary international law as well as numerous
human rights treaties to which the United States is a party.' 94 American
Indians within the United States today are subject to all of the laws
governing U.S. citizens and to several thousand additional statutes. 195
This system of federal law imposes a "quasi-sovereign" status on Indian
nations and subjects them to the "trusteeship" of the U.S. government.
As Robert Clinton states, "[v]estiges of the law's historic colonial role in
legitimating conquest and expropriation remain imbedded in the
doctrines employed today allegedly to protect Indian interests."' 1
The plenary power doctrine enunciated in Lone Wolf and Kagama is
alive and well in federal jurisprudence. In 1955, the Supreme Court held
in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States'9 that indigenous land is not
protected by the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment or its
requirement of just compensation.'" Turning the applicable law on its
head, the Court held that aboriginal title would not be recognized unless
the U.S. government had entered into a treaty or enacted a statute
granting an indigenous nation the right to permanently occupy its
ancestral land.' 9 As a result, the Tlingit and other native peoples, who
had neither been conquered in battle nor required to cede their land by
192. Id. at 592 (referencing 1975 I.C.J. 4 (Oct. 16, 1975)).
193. See id. at 593-97. "In addition, the international law character of these treaties
would make their provision potentially invocable before international bodies." Id. at 598.
See also supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 228-29, 237-38, 328-29, 333-36 and accompanying text.
195. See generally GETCHES ET AL., supra note 109. As Justice Blackmun noted in
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, reaching
a decision in cases affecting Indian rights requires "wandering the maze of Indian statutes
and case law dating back 100 years." 502 U.S. 251, 270 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also Frickey, supra note 90, at 382.
196. Clinton, supra note 113, at 109.
197. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
198. Id. at 288-89.
199. Id. at 277-78, 285.
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treaty, lost their claim to most of what is now Alaska." Justice Reed's
opinion misconstrued the Cherokee Cases to say that they permitted the
arbitrary confiscation of indigenous lands without compensation, based
on the U.S. conquest of all Indian nations.21' According to Nell Newton,
"Tee-Hit-Ton reveals a judicial attitude so committed to congressional
deference that the Court was willing to engage in the intellectual
dishonesty of characterizing the acquisition of Alaska as a conquest to
avoid protecting tribal rights.'202 As a result, billions of dollars in oil
revenue have gone to the state of Alaska and to oil companies, while the
Tlingit remain among the poorest people under U.S. jurisdiction.2 3
In the 1970s, it appeared that the Supreme Court might curtail
application of the plenary power doctrine to Indians, but this did not
happen. In 1973, Justice Marshall announced in McLanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Commission that the Court "had ceased reliance on the
colonial notion of a trusteeship over Indians as an extra-constitutional
source of Congressional power over their lives." 2°' Nonetheless, just five
years later, he justified the unilateral imposition of much of the Bill of
Rights on American Indian nations in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez by
saying, "Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the
powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess. ''2°
In 1974, in Morton v. Mancari,2 6 the Supreme Court engaged in an
equal protection analysis of a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) policy
200. See generally Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1629 (2000); John R. Bielski, Judicial Denial of Sovereignty for Alaskan Natives: An End to
the Self-Determination Era, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 1279 (2000); Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Twenty-
Five Years of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Self-Determination or Destruction
of the Heritage, Culture, and Way of Life of Alaska's Native Americans?, 12 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 305 (1997).
201. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 278-79; see also Newton, supra note 21, at
248.
202. Newton, supra note 21, at 249.
203. Id. at 248 n.299. In Tee-Hit-Ton, Justice Reed noted that if Indian title were to be
considered compensable without specific congressional authorization, there would be
pending claims aggregating nine trillion dollars. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 283 n.17. See
generally WILKINS, supra note 21, at 168-85.
204. Clinton, supra note 95, at 114 (citing McLanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164, 172 n.7 (1973)).
205. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978). While including language
apparently supportive of indigenous sovereignty, the Court concluded by citing Lone Wolf
for the "extraordinarily broad" authority Congress possesses over Indian matters. See id.
at 7; see also Clinton, supra note 95, at 115; Newton, supra note 21, at 265.
206. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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giving preferential treatment to Indian employment.2 7 This could have
been interpreted as an imposition of constitutional constraints on the
government's exercise of plenary power. However, the Court has used
Mancari to reinforce, rather than curb, the exercise of plenary power,
citing it in 1977 in Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks to
justify deference to congressional decisions regarding the use of Indian
funds2 °8 and in United States v. Antelope2 9 to uphold the application of
federal criminal law against an equal protection challenge brought by an
Indian who argued that white defendants committing the same act in the
same place had the benefit of the more lenient provisions of state law. 10
According to Newton, "the Antelope Court announced that all legislation
regarding tribal Indians had a legitimate governmental purpose: to
govern Indian tribes. Furthermore, under an equal protection challenge,
all such legislation would be permissible if not invidiously motivated and
not irrational."
2'
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,"2 Justice Rehnquist converted
pre-existing Indian sovereignty to "delegated sovereignty" (delegated by
the U.S. government, of course) and held that Indian nations were
precluded from trying non-Indians for crimes committed on reservations
unless Congress had expressly delegated such power to them by treaty or
by statute."3 In 1990, the Court extended Oliphant in Duro v. Reina,
2'4
holding that Indian criminal jurisdiction is limited to "tribal members"
and not "non-member Indians" '215 despite historical evidence that Indian
courts had exercised jurisdiction over non-member Indians since their
establishment. 16 To quote Nell Newton: "Whatever Congress wants,
207. The policy was allowed as primarily "political rather than racial in nature." Id. at
553 n.24.
208. 430 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1977). For an argument that both Weeks and United States v.
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), represent the emergence of constitutional limitations
on Congress' plenary power, see Comment, Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs After
Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 235 (1982).
209. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
210. Id. at 646.
211. Newton, supra note 21, at 280. This analysis was extended from individuals to
Indian nations in Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
212. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
213. Id. at 208.
214. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
215. Id. at 688.
216. Robert N. Clinton, Peyote and Judicial Political Activism: Neo-Colonialism and
the Supreme Court's New Indian Law Agenda, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 92 (1991). Clinton
argues that Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989) (holding that the Yakima Nation could not regulate a non-Indian owned
parcel in an open section of their reservation, but could do so in a closed portion), and
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Congress gets, and Mancari and its progeny are now increasingly
impressed to serve that end."27 Blue Clark summarized:
In spite of judicial whittling away at it, plenary authority
remains one of the cornerstones of federal dominance of Indian
affairs. Courts currently recognize that plenary power extends
over Indian affairs, regulation of liquor traffic, disposition of
tribal property and trust funds, and federal intervention in tribal
activities through secretarial discretion, as well as Congress's
action, and in the exercise of Indian sovereignty.21
The concrete consequences of the exercise of this plenary power is a
"trust" relationship imposed on Indian nations by the U.S. government
that has resulted in genocidal and ecocidal policies of almost
unimaginable proportions. Generations of Indian children were forcibly
removed from their families and imprisoned in "boarding schools" where
they were stripped of their culture, traumatized, and often sexually
abused."9 During some periods, the BIA Indian Health Services
sterilized up to one-half of all Indian women of childbearing age, without
Dep't of Hum. Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that members
of the Native American Church had no constitutionally protected right to use peyote in
religious practices), signal an era in which the federal judiciary will "foster a kind of neo-
colonialist control of Indian interests by non-Indian majorities through federal Indian
law." Id.; see also Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The
Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 7
(1999) (noting that this exercise of "extraordinary authority in an area in which Congress
has long operated with plenary power supports the disturbing conclusion that the Court
has assumed a legislative function -- that of implementing the ongoing colonial process")
(footnotes omitted).
217. Newton, supra note 21, at 285.
218. CLARK, supra note 59, at 109 (footnotes omitted); see also Newton, supra note 21,
at 234-35 (expanding on this list of powers and the cases supporting them). The plenary
power doctrine has also been used to justify the requirement that Indian nations submit to
state jurisdiction if they operate gaming operations. See generally Eric D. Jones, Note,
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: A Forum for Conflict Among the Plenary Power of
Congress, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Eleventh Amendment, 18 VT. L. REV. 127 (1993)
(analyzing decisions under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 100
Stat. 2487 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168)).
219. See generally DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION:
AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875-1928 (1995);
David Wallace Adams, From Bullets to Boarding Schools: The Educational Assault on the
American Indian Identity, in THE AMERICAN INDIAN EXPERIENCE, 1524 TO THE
PRESENT: A PROFILE 218-39 (Phillip Weeks ed., 1988); Raymond Cross, American Indian
Education: The Terror of History and the Nation's Debt to the Indian Peoples, 21 U. ARK.
LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 941 (1999); Jorge Noriega, American Indian Education in the
United States: Indoctrination for Subordination to Colonialism, in THE STATE OF NATIVE
AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 371-402 (M. Annette Jaimes
ed., 1992).
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their consent and often without their knowledge."" The government has
leased the most profitable land and mineral resources to white
individuals and corporations at prices dramatically -sometimes ninety
percent-below market value.2 ' Corporations have been allowed to strip
mine and produce radioactive waste, often leaving it in the immediate
vicinity of Indian housing and schools."2 A suit is currently pending that
charges the BIA with having "lost" billions of dollars worth of trust fund
assets223 generated from leases, other governmental appropriations, and
amounts due under treaties. Thus, because of federal government
actions, peoples who legally own significant land and resources constitute
the poorest sector of American society, and their communities suffer
from the lowest life expectancies, the highest infant mortality rates, the
highest suicide rates, and the highest rates of death from exposure,
communicable diseases, and alcoholism in the United States.2 24
The United States prides itself on being a nation of laws, and one of
the law's fundamental purposes is to provide remedies for wrongs. 22  As
the plenary power cases so clearly establish, constitutional remedies for
the wrongs perpetrated against American Indian peoples simply do not
exist. We turn, therefore, to the only other applicable source of law-
international law. Adherence to international law would mean
recognition of the right to self-determination, which James Anaya
describes as a
universe of human rights precepts concerned broadly with
peoples, including indigenous peoples, and grounded in the idea
that all are equally entitled to control their own destinies. Self-
220. See Ward Churchill, The United States and the Genocide Convention: A Half-
Century of Obfuscation and Obstruction, in WARD CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF
GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS, 1492 TO THE PRESENT 377
(1997).
221. See, e.g., Ward Churchill, Genocide in Arizona: The Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute in
Perspective, in WARD CHURCHILL, STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND: NATIVE NORTH
AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION 177 (1999)
(quoting estimates that the U.S. government was attempting to pay the Shoshone less than
one penny of actual value for each acre taken in Newe Segobia).
222. Churchill, Geographies of Sacrifice, supra note 82, at 239-9 1.
223. See generally Billee Elliott McAuliffe, Forcing Action: Seeking to "Clean Up" the
Indian Trust Fund. Cobell v. Babbitt, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 647, 656 (2001) (discussing a
lawsuit brought regarding government mismanagement of assets); see also Cobell v.
Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 1999), affd sub norn. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding Secretaries of Treasury and Interior in contempt for failing to
produce documents).
224. See, e.g., RENNARD STRICKLAND, TONTO'S REVENGE: REFLECTIONS ON
AMERICAN INDIAN CULTURE AND POLICY 52-53 (1997).
225. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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determination gives rise to remedies that tear at the legacies of
empire, discrimination, suppression of democratic participation,
and cultural suffocation."
The right of nations to "self-determination" has been publically
advocated by the United States since World War I 27 It is a foundational
principle of the Charter of the United Nationsm featured prominently in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)229 and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR),23° and recognized as a customary norm of international law,
perhaps even a jus cogens, or peremptory, norm.23
In token deference to this body of international law, in 1975 Congress
passed the Indian Self-Determination Act.32 However, rather than
acknowledging the real meaning of self-determination, the Act simply
provides for increased access to federal programs while maintaining all of
Congress' prerogatives under the plenary power doctrine.233  According
to James Anaya, "self-determination" by its very nature, cannot be
imposed upon a people but must be defined by them:
In pressing their demands internationally, indigenous peoples
have pointedly undermined the premise of the state as the
226. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (1996).
227. See Woodrow Wilson, The Fourteen Points Address, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS
READER: MAJOR POLITICAL ESSAYS, SPEECHES, AND DOCUMENTS FROM THE BIBLE
TO THE PRESENT 299-304 (Micheline R. Ishay ed., 1997).
228. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2.
229. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. I, § 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 173 [hereinafter ICCPR] ("All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.").
230. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5
[hereinafter ICESCR](providing the same rights as under article I of the ICCPR). The
United States, though instrumental in drafting both the ICCRP and the ICESCR, did not
ratify the ICCPR until 1992 and has signed but not ratified the ICESCR.
231. ANAYA, supra note 226, at 75 ("Self-determination is widely acknowledged to be
a principle of customary international law and even jus cogens, a peremptory norm."). See
Ediberto Roman, Empire Forgotten: The United States's Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42
VILL. L. REv. 1119, 1127-28 (1997) (explaining the principle of self-determination);
Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples), in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES 17-37 (James Crawford ed., 1988); Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems with
Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 301, 317-19 (1995). See generally, Araujo, supra note
2, at 1492-93.
232. Indian Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975), codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2000).
233. See id. See generally Markus B. Heyder, The International Law Commission's
Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Draft Article 19 and Native American Self-
Determination, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155 (1994).
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highest and most liberating form of human association .... The
model that is emerging . . . sees indigenous peoples as
simultaneously distinct from yet part of the states within which
they live, as well as part of other units of social and political
interaction that might include indigenous federations or
transnational associations. Within this model, self-
determination is achieved.., by the consensual development of
context-specific arrangements that uphold for indigenous
peoples both spheres of autonomy commensurate with relevant
cultural patterns and rights of participation in the political
processes of the states in which they live.
The incorporation of international law into U.S. jurisprudence is the
most promising way to ensure the end of genocidal and ecocidal policies
and practices, the adherence to existing treaties, the return of unceded
land, and the implementation of political self-determination.Y American
Indian nations, like the "unincorporated" territories controlled by the
United States, meet all of the substantive international criteria for "non-
self-governing territories. ''236  Thus, indigenous peoples in the United
234. S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples and International Law Issues, 92 AM. SocY
INT'L L. PROC. 96, 98 (1998).
235. See Curtis G. Berkey, International Law and Domestic Courts: Enhancing Self-
Determination for Indigenous Peoples, 5 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 65, 65 (1992) (noting that
because Congress and U.S. courts have failed to provide legal protection, Indian nations
should "turn to international human rights law for help in securing the right of self-
government against federal abrogation"). See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law. Redefining the Terms of
Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 665 (1990); Steven Paul
McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 217 (1993).
236. The U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories
and Peoples, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, begins
by stating, "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights." G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th
sess., Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961). This would appear to apply directly to Indian
nations. However, the United Nations -- being a body composed only of states -- followed
up with Resolution 1541 (XV), which constrains its application to people separated from
colonizing powers by at least thirty miles of open ocean. This requirement, however, adds
nothing substantive to the definition of a colonized people but simply protects colonizing
states which occupy the lands of others. See Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, Protection of
American Indian Territories in the United States: Applicability of International Law, in
IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS' ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 247, 260-61 (Imre
Sutton ed., 1985) (describing the inclusion of the "overseas requirement"). See generally
Ward Churchill, The Indigenous Peoples of North America: A Struggle Against Internal
Colonialism, in STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND: NATIVE NORTH AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO
GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION 15-33 (1999); Ward Churchill, A Breach of
Trust. The Radioactive Colonization of Native North America, in PERVERSIONS OF
JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND ANGLOAMERICAN LAW (forthcoming 2002) (on file
with author).
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States and residents of external colonies should be protected by all of the
provisions for self-determination described above, as well as the
Genocide Convention23 and the norms articulated with respect to
indigenous and colonized peoples in the United Nations Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples,2- the
International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention on Indigenous
Populations, 239 and the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.2 This draft declaration was developed by the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations, which was organized under the auspices of
the United Nations Human Rights Committee as a result of the efforts of
the indigenous International Indian Treaty Council in the late 1970s and
early 1980s.24'
Compliance with international law would not only allow for real self-
determination but would also ensure all peoples within U.S. jurisdiction
protections similar to, but more extensive than, those provided by the
Constitution. These protections, embodied in the many human rights
instruments developed by international organizations over the past half-
century, are articulated in the United Nations Charter, 242 the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,243 the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,244 and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,245 all of which have been ratified by and are
237. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, for the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989) (132
States parties). Forty years after the convention was drafted, the United States ratified it
with two reservations, five understandings, and one declaration, including a reservation
against jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice.
238. See infra notes 273-74.
239. International Labour Organization Convention on Indigenous Populations No.
169 of 27June 1989, in 28 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1382 (1989).
240. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Revised Working Paper
Submitted by the Chairperson/Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene Daes, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/26,
available at http://wwwl.uma.edu/humanrts/decra.htm. For a history and compilation of
related documents, see SHARON HELEN VENNE, OUR ELDERS UNDERSTAND OUR
RIGHTS: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS (1998).
241. See ROXANNE DUNBAR ORTIZ, INDIANS OF THE AMERICAS: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND SELF-DETERMINATION 27-72 (1984); Anaya, supra note 226, at 151-79; Venne, supra
note 240 at 107-63; JIMMIE DURHAM, A CERTAIN LACK OF COHERENCE: WRITINGS ON
ART AND CULTURAL POLITICS 38-56 (1993). See generally Russel Lawrence Barsh,
Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law?, 7 HARV.
HUM RTS. J. 33 (1994).
242. See supra note 228.
243. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, pt. 1, at
71, U.N. Doc A1810 (1948).
244. See supra note 237.
245. See supra note 229.
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therefore binding on the United States. Other instruments of protection,
such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,246 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,2 7 have been
signed but not ratified by the United States.
Adherence to these international human rights instruments would also
remedy the wrongs perpetrated against the residents of "unincorporated
territories" controlled by the United States. The United States currently
exercises jurisdiction over approximately four million people in Puerto
Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands,24s the "U.S." Virgin Islands, and
"American" Samoa.249 None is recognized as an independent country or
a state of the union, but all are subject to the plenary power of the U.S.
government. Although one of the basic tenets of international law is that
no person shall be rendered stateless, the residents of these territories
have been placed in a curious state of limbo with respect to citizenship.
As recently as 1998, a federal appellate court relied on Downes v.
Bidwell to deny U.S. citizenship to a person who was born in the
Philippines between 1898 and 1946, while it was a U.S. territory.2
According to the court, during this period Filipinos were "wards" of the
United States; they were "nationals" who owed allegiance to the United
States but were not entitled to the full benefits of citizenship. 1 Because
of the economic dependence and social ties created by U.S. colonization,
many Filipinos have tried to move to the United States, but they are
given no special consideration.f2 Instead, because of the backlog,
246. See supra note 230.
247. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, 166,167, 358, U.N. Doc. A144/736 (1989).
248. On the history of the Mariana Islands, see Marie Rios-Martinez, Comment,
Congressional Colonialism in the Pacific: The Case of the Northern Mariana Islands and Its
Covenant with the United States, 3 SCHOLAR 41 (2000).
249. Burnett & Marshall, supra note 145, at 1, 30 n.1 (citing GAO, Report to the
Chairman, Committee on Resources, House of Representatives, US. Insular Areas.
Application of the US. Constitution (1997)). See generally STANLEY K. LAUGHLIN, THE
LAW OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIES AND AFFILIATED JURISDICTIONS (1995). This
population figure does not include the more than two million Puerto Ricans who live on
the mainland and are entitled to the full protection of U.S. citizenship. See Rivera Ramos,
Colonialism, supra note 164, at 232.
250. Valmonte v. INS, 136 F.3d 914, 918 (2d Cir. 1998) (relying on the Insular Cases as
"authoritative guidance on the territorial scope of the term 'in the United States' in the
Fourteenth Amendment"). See also Rabang v. INS, 35 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1994).
251. Avelino J. Halagao, Jr., Citizens Denied: A Critical Examination of the Rabang
Decision Rejecting United States Citizenship Claims by Persons Born in the Philippines
During the Territorial Period, 5 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 77, 77-78 (1998). For the statutory
definition of "national," see 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(22)(B) (2000).
252. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, Act of March 24, 1934, Ch. 84, 48 Stat. 456,
promised eventual independence to the Philippines and limited Filipino immigration to
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Filipinos who apply to immigrate as immediate family members of U.S.
citizens or permanent residents have to wait longer than people from any
other country.23 Residents of American Samoa are U.S. "nationals;"
those who live in the other territories are called "citizens" but do not
have many of the rights of other U.S. citizens. 4
The plenary power doctrine is also used to justify the state of political
limbo in which Puerto Rico remains. In 1898, Puerto Ricans had their
own parliament, full Spanish citizenship, and political representation in
the Spanish parliament. 5 After more than a century of U.S. rule, they
have no representation in Congress and only qualified citizenship.5
According to Burnett and Marshall:
[T]he unincorporated territories were denied even the promise
of any final status, either within the constitutional framework or
outside of it. They were subjected not only to an unequal
condition but also to absolute uncertainty concerning their
fifty people per year. Despite their historic ties to the United States, Filipinos are now
subject to the same immigrant quotas as persons of all other nationalities. See §§ 203(a)-
(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
253. According to the State Department, as of February 2002, the wait for Filipino
spouses of permanent residents (and their unmarried children under twenty-one) was five
years, nine months. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Visa Bulletin,
No. 44, Vol. VIII (May 2002), available at http://travel.state.gov/visa bulletin.html. For
unmarried children over twenty-one, it was eight years, seven months. Id. Ironically, it is
harder for U.S. citizens to bring in Filipino children over twenty-one, the wait being about
thirteen years; for siblings, it is over twenty-two years. Id.
254. Before Congress enacted the Jones Act, which conferred citizenship (but not
representation in Congress) on Puerto Ricans in 1917, a statement by the Puerto Rican
House of Delegates was read into the Congressional Record. It states, in part: "[W]e
firmly and loyally maintain our opposition to being declared, in defiance of our express
wish or without our express consent, citizens of any country whatsoever other than our
own beloved soil that God has given us as an inalienable gift and incoercible right."
MEMORIAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF PUERTO RICO TO THE PRESIDENT AND
THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING CITIZENSHIP, 51 CONG. REC.
6718-20 (1914) (statement of Jos6 De Diego, Speaker of the House of Delegates of Puerto
Rico). For a thorough analysis of Puerto Rican citizenship, see Ediberto Romdn, The
Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of US. Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1 (1998).
255. See Monge, supra note 151, at 6-7. They had had this political representation for
over thirty years. See id.
256. Puerto Ricans living in Puerto Rico cannot vote for president or vice president,
and they have reduced governmental benefits. Because their citizenship was conferred by
statute, some believe it can also be revoked by Congress. See Lazos Vargas, supra note
149, at 934-36; see also Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994)
(explaining that a Puerto Rican registered to vote in a state can vote for president by
absentee ballot if she moves to a foreign country, but not if she returns to Puerto Rico);
Atty. Gen. of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that
American citizens living in Guam cannot vote for president).
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ultimate status-uncertainty about who they were, where they
belonged, and what their future held."7
Chief Justice Fuller, dissenting in Downes, characterized the majority's
position to be that "if an organized and settled province of another
sovereignty is acquired by the United States, Congress has the power to
keep it, like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous
existence for an indefinite period.",258 This is exactly what has happened.
In the referenda held on the status of Puerto Rico in 1952, 1967, and
1993, which offered choices of statehood, independence, or
commonwealth status, the latter prevailed. 29  However, because the
referenda were non-binding, they have been boycotted by many Puerto
Ricans, especially those who support independence.2'6  A 1998
referendum included a "none of the above" option that won an absolute
161majority of 50.3 percent. In 1996, a study by the U.S. House Committee
on Resources concluded that the "compact" currently governing U.S.-
Puerto Rico relations does not meet the United Nations' standards for
self-government; that Puerto Rico is still an unincorporated U.S.
territory; and that Congress can unilaterally revoke local self-government
and U.S. citizenship as long as it meets the "fundamental rights test" of
the Insular Cases.262
The United States' exercise of plenary power over its external
territories results in a variety of harms. According to Aaron Guevara,
the following indicators are determinative of Puerto Rico's colonial
status: (1) lack of equality under the law; (2) inability to vote in national
elections; (3) lack of representation in Congress; (4) application of the
laws passed by Congress; (5) lack of ability to decide its future status; and
(6) economic dependence. 3 Moreover,
257. Burnett & Marshall, supra note 145, at 12.
258. 182 U.S. 244, 372 (1901) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
259. See Romdn, supra note 254, at 39.
260. See Declet, supra note 162, at 57, n.245 (noting boycott of plebiscite). See
generally Lisa Napoli, The Puerto Rican Independentistas: Combatants in the Fight for Self-
Determination and the Right to Prisoner of War Status, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
131 (1996).
261. Monge, supra note 151, at 18-19.
262. See id. at 16 (citing HOUSE COMM. ON RESOURCES, REPORT 104-713, Part I,
U.S.-Puerto Rico Political Status Act, to Accompany H.R. 3024, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1996)). The locus of Congressional authority on this question suggests that the
government sees Puerto Rico as little more than another resource to be exploited.
263. Aaron Guevara, Puerto Rico: Manifestations of Colonialism, 26 REV. JUR. U.P.R.
275 n.4. The relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico is defined in the
Federal Relations Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 731-916 (1994). With respect to other U.S. territories,
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[t]he people of the United States . . . continue to be
complicitous in a vestigial colonialism. The "anti-imperialists"
of the turn of the century, after all, warned of consequences we
live with today: The United States continues to exercise
sovereignty over people (now its own citizens) denied equal
membership in the Union; the colonial system that many
warned would betray the nation's commitments to freedom and
equality endures.26
A consequence of Puerto Rico's colonial status is that the U.S. military
occupies a significant portion of the main island and continues, among
other things, to engage in the very controversial bombing of Vieques
Island.2'6 Estimates are that, as a result of U.S. policies, between one-
third and one-half of all Puerto Rican women have been sterilized.
26
Currently, "more than 60 percent of Puerto Rican families live under the
poverty level, just slightly less than in 1940."267 The annual per capita
income in Puerto Rico is one third of that in the United States, and
welfare benefits are significantly lower than in the United States.26 This
discrepancy is illustrated by a 1999 supplemental income cap of $32 per
month, compared with a mainland cap of $368 per month.269 Poverty has
exacerbated economic exploitation, especially where corporations can
manufacture goods in sweatshops, unregulated by U.S. labor laws, and
produce goods that can be imported with significantly lower tariffs and
still bear the "Made in the U.S.A." label.27°
Clearly, appeals for constitutional protection have proven futile and, as
with the internally colonized American Indian nations, the residents of
see Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its
Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REv. 445,447 (1992).
264. Burnett, Preface to FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 145, at xiv.
265. See Raymond Hernandez, A Tiny Island, but a Cause So C~lebre: From New York
to Hollywood -- Vieques Has Issues for Everyone, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at A25;
ALFREDO LOPEZ, DOt&A LICHA'S ISLAND: MODERN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO Rico 64
(1987) ("Today in Puerto Rico and Vieques ... there are over twenty active military
installations; they literally form a string around the entire island and cover about 75
percent of Vieques' land.").
266. See Churchill, The United States and the Genocide Convention, supra note 220, at
377.
267. Monge, supra note 151, at 19.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 20; see also LOPEZ, supra note 265, at 67-91.
270. See William Branigin, Top Clothing Retailers Labeled Labor Abusers; Sweatshops
Allegedly Run on US. Territory, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1999, at A14. See generally
Deborah J. Karet, Privatizing Law on the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands: Is Litigation the Best Channel for Reforming the Garment Industry? 48 BUFF. L.
REv. 1047 (2000).
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these external colonies would be best served by the enforcement of
existing norms of international law. Efren Rivera Ramos noted:
The conceptual scheme of the Insular Cases is entirely
incompatible with any notion of self-determination .... [self-
determination,] at a minimum[,] ... implies the right ... of a
people or group.., to determine its own status and associations
with other peoples or groups and to fashion for itself the
organizing principles of its social existence. The logic of the
Court's discourse, however, presupposes the plenary power of
the metropolitan state to determine the political condition and
the civil and political rights of the people of the acquired
territory.271
Again, the only legal remedies appear to be international. Enforcing
international law in this context would mean complying with all of the
basic instruments designed to ensure the civil, political, economic, social,
and cultural rights of all persons.272 These are the protections the United
States claims are adequately guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
However, such domestic law remedies, thanks to the plenary power
doctrine, are unenforceable in U.S. courts.
Compliance with international law mandates the recognition of such
civilian political rights as well as U.S. recognition of the sovereignty of
these territories. In 1960, a United Nations General Assembly
Resolution entitled the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples noted that "all peoples have an
inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty
and the integrity of their national territory" and proclaimed the
"necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in
all its forms and manifestations." '273 Among other things, the General
Assembly declared that "[i]mmediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and
Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not
yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those
territories, without any conditions or reservations.,
274
Since 1972, the United Nations Decolonization Committee and other
international organizations have called for the decolonization of Puerto
Rico.275 The United States' response is that Puerto Rico is not a colony
271. RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM,
supra note 164, at 298 (footnote omitted).
272. See supra notes 227-31, 237-40, 242-47 and accompanying text.
273. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 236, at 66-67.
274. Id.
275. Guevara, supra note 263, at 303-04.
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but a commonwealth. This is true, it asserts, because in 1950, Congress
declared a "compact" of free association between Puerto Rico and the
United States and gave Puerto Rico additional - but limited - powers
of self-government.276 The terms of the compact, however, were decided
upon by the United States and apparently can be changed unilaterally by
Congress. At a minimum, self-determination for Puerto Rico and each
of the other "unincorporated" U.S. territories will require real, not
simply formal, recognition of the law that has emerged from the United
Nations since 1948 regarding the independence of colonies and "trust
territories."
Finally, current application of the plenary power doctrine in
immigration law illustrates that in this area, we need to look to the
protections afforded under international law. Although it is generally
presumed that courts would no longer legally sanction the kind of blatant
racism that fueled the Chinese exclusion acts, the plenary power doctrine
that grew out of those cases is alive and well in immigration law. No
intervening legal decisions have prohibited immigration laws which
discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion,
and consequently the doctrine continues to be invoked to exclude those
perceived as "other." 77 The due process rights of noncitizens who have
not been officially admitted to the United States are still limited by the
position the Court announced in 1950 in United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy:278 "Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.
2 79
In Knauff, a slim majority of the Court, citing Nishimura Ekium and
Fong Yue Ting,2' held that the German wife of a U.S. citizen could be
excluded without a hearing upon the assertion of the Attorney General
that her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the United
States.m  This was true despite the fact that she had performed
276. Rom~in, Empire Forgotten, supra note 231, at 1151-61. In 1953, after Puerto Rico
became a "commonwealth" and elected a local government, the United States convinced
the United Nations to take Puerto Rico off its list of non-self-governing territories. G.A.
Res. 748, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., at 30-31, U.N. Doc. A/2556 (1953). See Guevara, supra
note 263, at 283-90; ROLAND I. PERUSSE, THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO Rico 164-
66 (1990).
277. Currently, this is often on the basis of perceived political beliefs or associations.
See generally Philip Monrad, Comment, Ideological Exclusion, Plenary Power and the
PLO, 77 CAL. L. REv. 831 (1989); see also infra notes 311-20 and accompanying text.
278. 338 U.S. 537 (1.950)
279. Id. at 544.
280. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892).
281. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,713-14 (1893).
282. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544-47.
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"excellent" work as a civilian employee of the U.S. War Department.23
Furthermore, the Court concluded in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei 4 that a permanent resident, returning from a trip to Europe to
visit his dying mother, could be held indefinitely on Ellis Island without a
hearing because the Attorney General had decided on the basis of
confidential information that his entry would be "prejudicial to the
public interest. '" ' It was irrelevant to the Court that Mezei had lived, in
Justice Jackson's words, "a life of unrelieved insignificance" for twenty-
five years in Buffalo, New York and had nowhere else to go.2
More recently, federal courts have used Knauff and Mezei to justify
the indefinite detention of undocumented Cubans who came from the
port of Mariel in 1980 and were deemed "excludable" by U.S.
immigration authorities; the detention of Haitian refugees pending
adjudication of their claims for political asylum; and the subsequent
interception and forced return of Haitians found on the high seas. In
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 2"' the first significant ruling of this
series, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the release of a
Mariel Cuban who was excludable under U.S. law but had no other
country to go to.28 The court first identified the problem:
[T]he case law generally recognizes almost absolute power in
Congress concerning immigration matters, holding that aliens in
petitioner's position cannot invoke the Constitution to avoid
exclusion and that detention pending deportation is only a
continuation of exclusion rather than "punishment" in the
constitutional sense.
In the instant case the detention is imprisonment under
conditions as severe as we apply to our worst criminals. It is
prolonged; perhaps it is permanent. 9
The court ordered Rodriguez-Fernandez released under the
immigration statute, noting that if the statute were construed differently,
283. Id. at 539.
284. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
285. Id. at 208-09, 216. After the United States took such a position, Mezei could find
no other country to accept him. Id. at 209.
286. Id. at 219 (Jackson, J., dissenting). To quote Justice Jackson's scathing dissent:
"Government counsel ingeniously argued that Ellis Island is his 'refuge,' whence he is free
to leave in any direction except west. That might mean freedom, if only he were an
amphibian!" Id. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
287. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
288. Id. at 1390.
289. Id. at 1385.
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it would violate both the Constitution and international law.29 The court
said that indefinite detention was punishment subject to constitutional
constraints: "Surely congress could not order the killing of Rodriguez-
Fernandez and others in his status on the ground that Cuba would not
take them back and this country does not want them."29' It countered
Supreme Court precedent from Fong Yue Ting2 to Mezet 9' by arguing
that "[n]o principle of international law is more fundamental than the
concept that human beings should be free from arbitrary
imprisonment." 294
Unfortunately, other federal courts of appeal have not followed the
Tenth Circuit's attempt to bring those subject to the exercise of plenary
power under the protections of international law.29' In 1984, the
Eleventh Circuit held in Jean v. Nelson296 that noncitizens who have not
been admitted continue to "have no constitutional rights with regard to
their applications, and must be content to accept whatever statutory
rights and privileges they are granted by Congress."29 The following
year the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in Garcia-Mir v.
Meese , which had followed Jean, noting specifically that claims under
international human rights law were inapplicable. As the Eleventh
Circuit said in Garcia-Mir, "[t]hese legal realities may be harsh, but they
are that way by design." 299
290. See id. at 1390.
291. Id. at 1387.
292. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
293. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
294. Id. at 1388 (citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American
Convention on Human Rights).
295. The Fourth Circuit upheld the indefinite detention of "excludable aliens." See
Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d. 100, 104-05 (4th Cir. 1982). The Second Circuit reversed a
district court decision ordering the release of detained Haitians. See Bertrand v. Sava, 684
F.2d 204, 219 (2d Cir. 1982). Similarly, a district court decision holding unconstitutional
the indefinite detention of Mariel Cubans pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality
Act was reversed by the Eleventh Circuit. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 584
(11th Cir. 1984).
296. 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), affd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
297. Id. at 968. The Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh Circuit should not have
reached the constitutional question and declined to revisit Knauff or Mezei. Jean v.
Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854-55 (1985).
298. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
299. See id. at 1484. Thus, for example, even though Cuban prisoners were held in
maximum security federal penitentiaries, subjected to strip searches and beatings, and
moved arbitrarily from facility to facility, they apparently have no Eighth Amendment
rights because INS detention is civil, not criminal, per Fong Yue Ting and its progeny. See
Richard A. Boswell, Throwing Away the Key: Limits on the Plenary Power?, 18 MICH. J.
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The consequences grew harsher in the 1990s. In 1993, in Reno v.
Flores,"" the Supreme Court upheld an Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) policy of imprisoning about one thousand unaccompanied
children per year, often in adult facilities, rather than releasing them to
non-custodial family members or guardians.' The Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 3 dramatically reduced
due process rights and judicial review of immigration decisions and
retroactively rendered permanent residents deportable based on prior
criminal convictions.""
In 2001, the Supreme Court held in Zadvydas v. Davis35 that
congressional plenary power "is subject to important constitutional
limitations," which qualify the government's ability to detain indefinitely
permanent residents who are to be deported but do not have countries
willing to accept them.3 6 While this decision has allowed lower courts
some discretion to ameliorate the harshest consequences of the 1996
acts,3 it does not signal a fundamental change in the plenary power
INT'L L. 689, 702 (1997) (book review). For a summary of the plenary power doctrine in
this context, see Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of
Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1087 (1995).
300. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315 (1993).
301. George Michael C. Ranalli, Note, Reno v. Flores: Plenary Power Over
Immigration Alive and Well, 45 MERCER L. REV. 889, n.1 (1994). In 1990, the INS
arrested more than 8,500 noncitizen minors, roughly seventy percent of whom were
unaccompanied. Flores, 507 U.S. at 295.
302. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
303. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996).
304. See generally Lucas Guttentag, Slamming the Courthouse Door. Immigrants and
the Right to Judicial Review, 28 HUM. RTs. 19 (2001); Lisa J. Laplante, Expedited Removal
at U.S. Borders: A World Without a Constitution, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 213
(1999); Victoria Cook Capitaine, Note, Life in Prison Without a Trial: The Indefinite
Detention of Immigrants in the United States, 79 TEX. L. REV. 769 (2001); Anne E. Pettit,
Note, "One Manner of Law": The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and the Immigration Law
Plenary Power Doctrine, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165 (1996).
305. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
306. See id. at 695 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,941-42 (1983)).
307. See, e.g., Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 309, 310 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Zadvydas
and applying heightened due process scrutiny to pre-removal-order detention of a long-
term permanent resident); Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 529-31 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on
Zadvydas to find pre-removal mandatory detention unconstitutional as applied to
petitioner).
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doctrine because the Zadvydas opinion cites Mezei.° and The Chinese
Exclusion Case3°9 with approval and relies more on ambiguity in the
statute than on the Constitution to support its conclusion.31°
Recent cases have merged exclusion based on race or national origin
with exclusion based on political belief or association, allowing the INS
to use secret evidence to detain and deport a number of Muslims and
persons of Arab or Middle Eastern descent.311 Georgetown law professor
David Cole, who has represented thirteen individuals in such deportation
cases, testified before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee:
At one time, the INS claimed that all 13 posed a direct threat to
the security of the nation, and that the evidence to support that
assertion could not be revealed-in many instances could not
even be summarized-without jeopardizing national security.
Yet in none of these cases did the INS's secret evidence even
allege, much less prove, that the aliens had engaged in or
supported any criminal, much less terrorist, activity."'
The INS sought to preempt constitutional challenges to its use of
secret evidence by invoking Congress' plenary power, using The Chinese
Exclusion Case,313 as well as Knauff14 and Mezei," ' as authority? Some
federal courts forced the INS to reveal its evidence and, seeing how
flimsy it was, ordered the detainees released.' However, the Supreme
308. 345 U.S. 537 (1953).
309. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
310. "Despite this constitutional problem, if 'Congress has made its intent' in the
statute 'clear, we must give effect to that intent."' Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (citations
omitted).
311. See generally David Cole, Hanging With the Wrong Crowd Of Gangs, Terrorists,
and the Right of Association, 1999 Sup. Cr. REv. 203 (1999); Kevin R. Johnson, The
Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the
Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J.
833 (1997); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and
the "Racing" of Arab Americans as "Terrorists," 8 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2001).
312 Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 999, Pt. I: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Immigration and Claims of the House Comm On the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 42 (2000)
(Statement of Professor David Cole, Georgetown University Law Center), available at
http://www. house.gov/judiciary/coleO2lO.htm.
313. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
314. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
315. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
316. See, e.g., Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 419 (D. N.J. 1999) (granting writ
of habeas corpus); 92 F. Supp. 2d 403, 409 (D. N.J. 2000) (granting attorney's fees), rev'd
sub. nom. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001).
317. See, e.g., Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1989), remanded to 795 F.
Supp. 13 (D. D.C. 1992). The INS attempted to deport 22-year-old Fouad Rafeedie, a
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Court effectively undermined this trend by holding in Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee"' that after the passage of IIRIRA
federal courts have dramatically limited jurisdiction to review
deportation decisions at all.3"9 This case was another victory for the
plenary power doctrine, one that set the stage for the Justice
Department's current assertion that it can indefinitely detain non-citizens
of "Middle Eastern origin" in the wake of the attacks on the Pentagon
and the World Trade Center.32 °
The plenary power doctrine in immigration law is premised explicitly
on the notion that the political branches of the federal government are
responsible for the nation's security and for its relations with other
sovereigns. This is presumed to be acceptable because "aliens," as they
are designated in immigration law, have their own sovereigns to protect
them. However, this is problematic for several reasons. First, the
individuals involved are often long-term permanent residents of the
United States with substantial ties to this country, including jobs, homes,
and spouses or children who are U.S. citizens. It clearly violates
international law for the U.S. government to disavow responsibility for
the protection of their basic rights. Second, reliance on the intervention
of another government is a blunt and ineffective remedy for individual
violations of human rights, one which happens only occasionally in
particularly egregious or highly publicized cases. Finally, the theory that
another sovereign is responsible for protecting the noncitizens' rights
permanent resident, as he returned from Syria where he had attended a conference
affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Id. at 509. The INS had
held no hearing and put forth no evidence, in open court or on the record, claiming that to
do so would be "prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security of the United States."
Id. at 508. As the D.C. Circuit said, "Rafeedie -- like Joseph K. in The Trial -- can prevail.
. only if he can rebut the undisclosed evidence against him.... It is difficult to imagine
how even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden." Id. at 516; see
also JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 128-137 (1999)
(summarizing secret evidence cases); Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two
Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51, 73-81 (1999)
(summarizing secret evidence cases).
318. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
319. See generally John A. Scanlan, American-Arab -- Getting the Balance Wrong --
Again!, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 347 (2000).
320. See NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT 69-87 (2002) (discussing the
treatment of the "disappeared"). See generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 953 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After September 11?,
American Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, - GEO. IMMIG. L.J. - (forthcoming
2002).
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only works if the United States complies with international law
governing sovereign-to-sovereign relations.
As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out in Rodriguez-
Fernandez, current interpretation and enforcement of U.S. immigration
law violates international law in numerous ways.322 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights proclaims a right to freedom of movement,
with specific protections for persons seeking asylum from persecution.
23
The rights of asylum seekers are spelled out in the Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol, to which the United States is a
party.324 International norms are also violated by the United States'
arbitrary and indefinite detention of persons, including juveniles, and by
the current immigration restrictions relating to HIV/AIDS.32  These
problems are compounded by provisions of the 1996 Illegal Immigration
326Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which has been called a
"fearsome example of how individual rights can be abridged in a country
that fails to take its international human rights obligations seriously.,
327
The IIRIRA abrogates U.S. obligations under various treaties,
including those contained in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
321. This includes respecting the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular
Relations, see infra note 333, as well as various treaties of friendship and extradition
agreements, see infra note 335 and accompanying text.
322. 654 F.2d 1382 (1981); see supra notes 287-94. See also Robert J. Williams, Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council and Its Aftermath: A Problematic Gap in International
Immigration Law, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 55 (1995) (analyzing the Sale decision,
which refused to give extraterritorial application to the Refugee Convention).
323. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13, para. 2, art. 14, para. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/811 (1948) (unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly).
324. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 26,19 U.S.T. 6273
(entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) (137 States parties). The United States has neither
signed nor ratified this treaty, but it is binding by virtue of the U.S. ratification of the
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered
into force Oct. 4, 1967, for the U.S., Nov. 1, 1968) (136 States parties; U.S. ratified with
two reservations).
325. See Amnesty International, United States of America: Amnesty International's
Concerns Regarding Post-September 11 Detentions in the USA (Mar. 13, 2002), available at
http://www.amnesty.org; Joan Fitzpatrick & William Mckay Bennett, A Lion in the Path?
The Influence of International Law on the Immigration Policy of the United States, 70
WASH. L. REv. 589,608-18 (1995).
326. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
327. Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT'L LAW 117,
160 (2001).
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Refugees,32' the 1985 Convention Against Torture,3 9  and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.33 "The IIRIRA
breaches numerous individual rights and duties of states that arise from
these treaties, including the right to be free from arbitrary detention, the
right to due process of law, the duty of non-refoulement, the duty not to
punish asylum seekers who enter illegally, and the duty of good faith
interpretation of treaties."33'
The harshest consequences of U.S. immigration law and policy have
thus far been deemed constitutionally acceptable by the Supreme Court.
In fact, "[u]nder current doctrine, there is no domestic remedy for
victims of the United States' derogations from international standards." '332
These violations could be prevented, however, if the United States courts
would enforce the treaties identified above, as well as the Vienna
Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations,333 the Convention
328. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. NO. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) (incorporating the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees).
329. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force June 26, 1987,for the US. Nov. 20,
1995 (124 States parties). The U.S. ratified with three reservations, one understanding,
and one declaration, all of which qualify its commitments.
330. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 229. The U.S.
ratified with five reservations, five understandings, four declarations, and one proviso.
The United States is neither a party to the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21st sees., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N.
Doc. A/6313 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 (98 States parties), nor to the Second
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at
Abolition of the Death Penalty, U.N. GAOR, 44th sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force July 11, 1991) (45 States parties).
331. Ramji, supra note 327, at 117-18. The United States is a party to each of these
conventions. See supra notes 245, 324, 329.
332. Ramji, supra note 327, at 118. See generally Meredith K. Olafson, Note, The
Concept of Limited Sovereignty and the Immigration Law Plenary Power Doctrine, 13
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 433 (1.999) (arguing that the plenary power doctrine does not comport
with contemporary public international law).
333. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95
(entered into force Apr. 24, 1964); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24,
1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967). These conventions have
particular significance in the human rights arena because they require particular
protections for noncitizens, which are frequently ignored by the United States. See, e.g.,
Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (refusing to stay the execution of a Paraguayan
national not informed of his right to contact his consulate and despite a provisional order
of the International Court of Justice to stay the execution). See generally Joan Fitzpatrick,
The Unreality of International Law in the United States and the LaGrand Case, 27 YALE J.
INT'L L. 427 (2002).
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on the Rights of the Child,3 and various applicable treaties of friendship
and commerce or extradition.335 In the wake of the indefinite and
unexplained detention of unidentified persons since September 11, 2001,
the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons
should be added to the list as well. 336
Compliance with international law would, in addition, require that
federal courts acknowledge claims for redress for past violations of
fundamental human rights. As Karen Parker and Jennifer Chew stated,
"[t]he right to redress an international wrong is recognized by scholars as
a fundamental principle of customary law. Recognition of this right
clearly pre-dates World War II, and it has been incorporated into both
treaties and international legal opinions. ''337 In light of redress programs
that have been instituted following the horrors of World War II, a
considerable body of international law is evolving in this field. These
laws would have to be taken seriously if international law were
334. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (191
States parties). The United States and Somalia, which lacks a functioning government, are
the only countries which are not parties to this treaty.
335. The problem is illustrated by United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655
(1992). There, the Supreme Court held that the abduction of a Mexican citizen by U.S.
agents did not violate the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty of May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059,
because the treaty, while providing avenues for extradition, did not explicitly forbid
abduction. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657-58. See generally Royal J. Stark, Comment,
The Ker-Frisbie-Alvarez Doctrine: International Law, Due Process, and United States
Sponsored Kidnapping of Foreign Nationals Abroad, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 113 (1993).
336. Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, 33 I.L.M. 1529
(1994) (entered into force Mar. 28, 1996). The United States is neither a party to this
treaty, nor to the American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Josd Costa Rica,"
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 (entered into force July 18, 1978); the Additional
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights "Protocol of San Salvador,"
O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 69 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999); the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 67 (entered into
force Feb. 28, 1987); or the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment
and Eradication of Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1535 (entered into
force Mar. 5, 1995).
337. Karen Parker & Jennifer F. Chew, Compensation for Japan's World War II War-
Rape Victims, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 497, 524 (1994) (citation omitted).
This principle was recognized by the district court in Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp.
787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980), affd 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). See also Jim6nez de
Ar6chaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 REC. DES COURS 285-87
(1978), reprinted in Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 583 (3d ed. 1993) ("[A] State discharges the responsibility incumbent upon it
for breach of an international obligation by making reparation for the injury caused.");
Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: US. Disregard for International Law in the
World War H Internment of Japanese Peruvians -- A Case Study, 40 B.C. L. REv. 275, 312-
15 (1998).
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incorporated into U.S. jurisprudence.338 Thus far, the United States has
a poor record of complying with international law when other sovereigns
have stepped forward to protect the rights of their citizens.339 If the
United States wants to claim a prerogative based on its own sovereignty,
it can do so only to the extent that it complies with international law, and
it cannot do so by relying on the plenary power doctrine.
Despite Chief Justice Marshall's disclaimer that "the relation of the
Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal
distinctions which exist no where else," 3 the law described in this
Section is not simply an aberration within U.S. jurisprudence. When the
areas of immigration law, "federal Indian law," and the law governing
external territories are considered together, they encompass a significant
sector of the people subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Further, the plenary
power doctrine is not aberrational because it encompasses powers that
can, and have been, extended to almost any sector of the population by
virtue of the United States' assertion that it is in its sovereign interest to
do so.
Federal Indian law does not deserve its image as a tiny
backwater of law .... [F]ew areas, if any, are more fundamental
to an assessment of the normative and institutional components
of American law. Indeed, federal Indian law is rooted in the
most basic of propositions about the American constitutional
system: it is inescapably the product both of the colonization of
the western hemisphere by European sovereigns and of the
corresponding displacement of indigenous peoples 41
The plenary power doctrine extends to military law and has effectively
been applied to persons in prison or otherwise in the custody of the
criminal justice system.' It has most often been exercised over people
identified as outsiders on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin,
but has also been extended to people on the basis of religion and political
or ideological association.343 As long as a "national security" rationale
33& See generally STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG
LEGACY (1997); DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
(1999).
339. See infra notes 333, 335 and accompanying text.
340. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
341. Frickey, supra note 90, at 383.
342. See supra note 26.
343. See generally WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL
SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 1903-1933 (1963).
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can be invoked, the plenary power doctrine can be extended to any
group over whom the U.S. government has, or takes, jurisdiction.3
IV. CONCLUSION: PLENARY POWER AND THE SUBVERSION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
American jurisprudence is generally thought to encompass the body of
domestic law founded on the Constitution. It provides for checks and
balances among the branches of government and protects the
fundamental human rights embodied in the Bill of Rights and the
Reconstruction era amendments. The extent to which the United States
fails to comply with international law, particularly human rights and
humanitarian law, is frequently measured in terms of the "gap" between
the mandates of the Constitution and those of international law.
However, as the previous Sections have illustrated, there is a large and
very significant sector of American jurisprudence -the application of
U.S. law to those under U.S. jurisdiction-encompassed by the plenary
power doctrine, under which the courts refuse to apply either the
protections of the Constitution or international law and justify this
refusal on the basis of U.S. sovereignty.
The harsh consequences of the plenary power doctrine have been
frequently criticized. The solution most frequently advanced, however, is
not the application of international law, but the extension of
constitutional protections to those subject to the government's plenary
power.345 This Section concludes by arguing that an "intraconstitutional"
solution is inadequate and that international human rights law must be
344. Felix Cohen asserted, "Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts from
fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even
more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic
faith." COHEN, supra note 117, at v. The truth of this observation is again apparent as
plenary power, with its accompanying disregard for basic human rights, is extended to a
shifting configuration of "others." Thus, in immigration law, legal principles designed to
exclude the Chinese are used against Europeans accused of being "communists" and
Muslims presumed to be "terrorists," and what was conceived on the basis of race can be
applied on the basis of national origin, religion, culture, political belief, or any other
signifier of outsider status. See supra notes 277-320 and accompanying text.
345. In a powerful critique of the plenary power doctrine in immigration law, Hiroshi
Motomura argues that courts have used "phantom" constitutional norms in
"subconstitutional," i.e., statutory and regulatory, decisions to gradually introduce
constitutional constraints into immigration decisions that formally fall under the plenary
power doctrine. See Motomura, supra note 21, at 560-600. Such cases, he says, illustrate
that decisionmakers realize the inadequacy of the plenary power doctrine and are moving
toward the full constitutionalization of immigration law. See id. at 600-13. For an
argument advocating the "constitutionalization" of federal Indian law, see Federal Plenary
Power in Indian Affairs after Weeks and Sioux Nation, supra note 208.
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incorporated into U.S. jurisprudence and applied by U.S. courts. To do
otherwise is to allow the United States to assert, in direct contravention
of the principles it urged upon the world at Nuremberg, that state
sovereignty can shield a government from complying with its
international treaty obligations and acknowledged norms of customary
international law.
While the extension of constitutional protections would in many cases
lead to more humane results, this solution is inadequate for several
reasons. First, an intraconstitutional approach denies the rights of
colonized peoples subject to plenary authority to decide for themselves
the nature of their affiliation with the United States. This is illustrated
by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rice v. Cayetano,34 where the
Court used a race-based equal protection analysis to strike down a rule
that only those of native Hawaiian descent were eligible to vote for the
trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, thereby opening the vote to
white settlers.347 Chris Iijima, noting that the "colonization of native
people is wrapped and justified in the rhetoric and the ideology of white
supremacy, '" 4 explained why the Supreme Court's application of a
standard equal protection analysis was inappropriate:
The inquiry should not be whether Native Hawaiians constitute
a "race" ..... Instead, the question should be whether they have
been specifically harmed as a people by the loss of their
nationhood. It is not acceptable to confuse the remedy for loss
of nationhood with the remedy for the denial of equal access to
political, social, and economic power demanded by other
subordinated groups within America. . . . [T]here can be no
"cure" without proper diagnosis.349
Similarly, equal protection within the polity is not a remedy for the
United States' disregard of American Indian sovereignty. Indian nations
have consistently rejected the U.S. government's attempts to force them
into the polity and have fought instead for independence and the
enforcement of treaties.3"' The United States' claims to incorporate
346. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
347. Id. at 512, 520, 522 (rejecting the proposition, based on Mancari, that this was a
political rather than racial distinction). See generally Gavin Clarkson, Not Because They
Are Brown, But Because of Ea: Rice v. Cayetano, 528 US. 495 (2000), 24 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL. 921 (2001).
348. lijima, supra note 147, at 120-21.
349. Id. at 123-24 (citations omitted).
350. See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument
of Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous People's Rights of Self-Determination, 8
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 51 (1991); Larry Sager, Rediscovering America: Recognizing
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American Indian lands and peoples have no more legitimacy under
international law than did Germany's claims to Luxembourg or the
Netherlands in the early 1940s.3 11 The disastrous consequences of
assimilationist policies can be seen throughout the history of colonial rule
and in contemporary American Indian communities. The tragic story
weaves through the genocidal impact of European diseases and attempts
to "Christianize" Indians, the loss of land and community following the
Allotment Act, 352 to the multi-generational trauma inflicted by boarding
schools whose stated purpose was to "kill the Indian and save the man,"
to the urban resettlement programs of the 1950s and 1960s, which left
large numbers of people homeless and unemployed.353
The devastation wrought upon indigenous communities is presumably
a "worst case" scenario for assimilation into the polity. However,
because many people currently subject to the plenary power doctrine are
willing to give up their claims to sovereignty or self-determination in
exchange for equal protection,3 4 the option should be considered in light
of what is presumably the "best case" scenario-the extension of full
constitutional protection to African Americans. It should be the "best
case" because the full range of domestic legal protections has, in theory,
been extended to African Americans-full and unconditional citizenship,
constitutionally mandated equal protection under the law, and a wide
range of protective and remedial legislation. 5 Nonetheless, courts have
the Sovereignty of Native American Indian Nations, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 745
(1999).
351. See ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY
OF DICTATORSHIP xiii (1941) (defining such conduct as characteristic of what he terms a
"prerogative state").
352. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
353. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Michael J. Meagher, Broken Promises: The Failure of
the 1920s Native American Irrigation and Assimilation Policies, 19 U. HAw. L. REV. 1, 2-4
(1997); James A. Casey, Note, Sovereignty by Sufferance: The Illusion of Indian Tribal
Sovereignty, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 404, 412 (1994) ("The assimilationist policies of the
federal government were disastrous for Indian peoples.").
354. See, e.g., JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RIco: THE
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985). Judge Torruella, the first Puerto Rican
appointed to any federal court of appeals, sees Puerto Rico's current status as "separate
and unequal" on "a par with Plessy v. Ferguson," and advocates elevation to full equality
through statehood. See Jose A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional
Doctrine, 100 HARV. L. REV. 450, 453 (1986) (book review) (summarizing Torruella's
arguments).
355. See supra notes 50-70 and accompanying text; see also Nathaniel R. Jones, The
Lessons of History, 20 YALE L. & POL. REV. 369 (2002) (discussing constitutionally
mandated desegregation).
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consistently interpreted these constitutional and legislative protections in
ways that minimize their impact rather than ensure their enforcement.'-
6
While an assessment of the African-American legal experience is
beyond the scope of this article, the ongoing injustices that have not been
remedied by intraconstitutional solutions are well-known and well
documented.357 They are, however, summarized in the oft-quoted
statements of two great African-American leaders. In 1852, Frederick
Douglass, while fighting to abolish slavery, said:
This Fourth of July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice I must
mourn.... The blessings in which you, this day, rejoice, are not
enjoyed in common. The rich inheritance of justice, liberty,
prosperity and independence, bequeathed by your fathers, is
shared by you, not by me. The sunlight that brought light and
healing to you, has brought stripes and death to me.
One hundred and forty years later, on July 4, 1992, Supreme
Court Justice Thurgood Marshall stated:
I wish I could say that racism and prejudice were only distant
memories.., and that liberty and equality were just around the
bend.... But as I look around, I see not a nation of unity but of
division-Afro and white, indigenous and immigrant, rich and
poor, educated and illiterate.... [T]here is a price to be paid for
division and isolation.359
The African-American experience, paralleled in many respects by the
experience of other "minorities" in the United States, and the terrible
price paid by indigenous peoples for U.S. attempts to assimilate them'
illustrate the limitations of a domestic legal solution to problems caused
by the government's exercise of plenary power."'
356. See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR (1970);
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987).
357. See generally Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
(1968) (Kerner Commission Report); ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND
WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992).
358. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 128 (illustration).
359. Id.
360. These problems are also reflected in other settler societies. See generally
ANDREW ARMITAGE, COMPARING THE POLICY OF ABORIGINAL ASSIMILATION:
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND (1995); GEOFFREY YORK, THE
DISPOSSESSED: LIFE AND DEATH IN NATIVE CANADA (1990).
361. This thesis is supported by Jack Chin's exposition of the notion that even had the
Supreme Court been making its immigration decisions within a constitutional framework,
it would have reached essentially the same results that it did using the plenary power
doctrine. See Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology
and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2000); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and
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Advocating the incorporation of international law into U.S.
jurisprudence does not suggest that those currently subject to the plenary
power doctrine should not benefit from equal protection under the
Constitution. It is, instead, an argument that expanding
intraconstitutional protection is insufficient. Not only have
intraconstitutional remedies proven themselves to be inadequate, but
limiting those subject to U.S. jurisdiction to such remedies in and of itself
violates international law. This is due to the domestic doctrines that
"override" international law and because the solution presumes that the
United States has legitimate jurisdiction over these peoples. Further
assimilation of those regarded as "other" into the U.S. polity may not be
their choice, as illustrated by Puerto Rican opposition to statehood and
the long history of Indian resistance to incorporation into the American
polity. As Judge Cabranes asserted, "[p]owerlessness is what colonialism
is all about. And decolonization in all its varieties-whether it is national
independence, autonomy or free association, or political integration into
the metropolitan state on the basis of equality-is everywhere supposed
to be the antidote to this historical political impotence."'3 62 Most
importantly, the way in which decolonization occurs should be a choice
for the colonized, not the colonizers, to make.
The best solution to the many violations of international law
occasioned by the U.S. government's invocation of plenary power
remains the actual incorporation of international law into U.S.
jurisprudence. This is not to imply that legal changes alone will solve
these problems. Instead, the Supreme Court's plenary power decisions
"are not the ultimate determinants of the reproduction of the colonial
condition. The reproduction of the relationship of subordination that
colonialism entails is the resultant of diverse factors that have served to
reinforce each other in a multidimensional process." 363 Nonetheless,
Enforcement: A Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
289 (2000) (generally agreeing with Chin's thesis, but arguing that immigration law is
particularly vulnerable to improper racial bias); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration
Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 307 (2000) (proposing some qualifications, but generally agreeing with Chin's thesis).
As long as U.S. policy is driven by colonial imperatives to acquire more land, labor, and
resources, assimilation cannot be considered a viable option. Such imperatives will only
cease to exist through the recognition of real self-determination for all peoples, at which
point the issue will be framed as voluntary co-operative relationships between peoples, not
the assimilation of one group into another. See generally Ward Churchill, I Am Indigenist:
Notes on the Ideology of the Fourth World, in WARD CHURCHILL, FROM A NATIVE SON:
SELECTED ESSAYS ON INDIGENISM, 1985-1995 509-46 (1996).
362. Cabranes, supra note 150, at 40.
363. Rivera Ramos, Colonialism, supra note 164, at 311.
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restructuring the legal paradigm within which the United States operates
would go a long way toward reversing this process of reinforcement
because real decolonization and protection of fundamental human rights
requires a jurisprudence that explicitly incorporates international law.
A first step would be to recognize that American jurisprudence
comprises both intraconstitutional law and the extraconstitutional
exercise of jurisdiction under the plenary power doctrine because
American law accompanies U.S. jurisdiction.6' The law has followed the
flag, even if the Constitution has not. Where the courts have invoked the
plenary power doctrine, constitutional rights have not been protected,
nor has the global rule of law been adhered to, despite the Constitution's
specific directive that the law of nations is part of the supreme law of the
land.365 In fact, it appears that the plenary power doctrine is invoked
precisely to avoid otherwise applicable domestic and international law.
366
Even Justices White and Brown, writing for the majority in Downes,
acknowledged that all persons have some fundamental or "natural"
rights, yet the Supreme Court has never identified the law that protects
such rights. Individuals, communities, and nations have been and
continue to be damaged and destroyed by the government's exercise of
plenary power.
Because the Constitution was not designed to36 and does not, in fact,
protect all persons within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, we must
acknowledge both that the plenary power doctrine is a significant part of
American jurisprudence and that the United States has obligations under
364. While one could see the exercise of the plenary power as "intraconstitutional"
because it has been deemed consistent with the Constitution, the point is to incorporate
law that provides protections not afforded within this constitutional framework.
365. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
(noting that international law is part of United States law and must be "administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction").
366. This pattern is clearly seen in the United States' recent attempts to rationalize its
treatment of Afghans and others allegedly affiliated with al Qaeda who are being held
without charge in open air cages on the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba. The
United States asserts that neither constitutional protections nor the laws of war apply. See
Carol Rosenberg, In Limbo: Detainees Await the Next Step, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 17,
2002, at 20A ("[The al Qaeda and Taliban captives] are men without countries from a war
that has never been declared. They are prisoners defined as 'detainees,' caged up by the
U.S. military on a slice of territory that is technically not American soil."); see also Cole,
supra note 320, at 953-54; Human Rights Watch, US.: Growing Problem of Guantanamo
Detainees, May 30, 2002, available at http://www.hrw.org.
367. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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international law to all persons under its jurisdiction.36  A first step is
recognizing that American law encompasses not only a large body of
statutes, common law, and judicial decisions, which fall within the
parameters of the Constitution, but also the law that is created and
enforced by the U.S. government and has been declared by the Supreme
Court to be essentially unconstrained by the Constitution. To the extent
the latter is actually law and not simply the exercise of raw power, we
must insist that it be effectively constrained by the enforcement of
international law in U.S. courts. This would preserve the United States'
claim to be a "nation of laws;" to do otherwise makes us all
"complicitous in a vestigial colonialism"37 which elevates "might makes
right" to the status of judicial doctrine.
369. In other contexts, I have referred to this as a "metaconstitutional" jurisprudence.
See Asserting Plenary Power Over the "Other," supra note 36. In advocating the
incorporation of international law, I do so with the recognition that it is limited because all
of its foundational principles are rooted in the European legal tradition, and it focuses
almost exclusively on the relations between sovereign "states" to the exclusion of the
indigenous nations upon whose land and people those states are built. For an excellent
exposition of the centrality of the colonial confrontation to contemporary international
law, see Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1999). See also Makau
Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L
L. 201 (2001). On the relationship between nations and states, see supra note 2.
370. See Burnett, supra note 264, at xiv.
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